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IMAGINING A MORE HUMANE IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE 
AGE OF OBAMA: THE USE OF PLENARY POWER TO HALT THE 
STATE BALKANIZATION OF IMMIGRATION REGULATION 
KRISTINA M. CAMPBELL* 
INTRODUCTION 
The first decade of the twenty-first century has been grim for immigrants 
to the United States—both legal and undocumented—and the lawyers and 
advocates who work on their behalf.  Following the failure of comprehensive 
immigration reform at the federal level, states and municipalities have seen fit 
to take matters into their own hands and pass a patchwork of local ordinances, 
statutes, and ballot initiatives ostensibly designed to do what the federal 
government had failed to do—regulate the flow of immigration into their cities 
and towns.  As the economy continues to spiral downward into what may very 
well be the next Great American depression, the impact of immigrants to the 
United States on our economy and the benefits and burdens of their presence 
continues to be the source of great debate. 
With the election of President Barack Obama—himself the son of an 
immigrant—immigrants’ rights advocates were hopeful that the new 
Administration would not only reject the George W. Bush Administration’s 
interpretation of immigration policy—which took a permissive view toward 
the ability of state and local governments to regulate immigration—but that the 
Obama Administration would also urge Congress to pass comprehensive 
immigration reform that reflects a more just and humane approach toward 
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freedom of movement within the European Union and how such a concept might apply to 
immigration law and policy in the United States.  I would also like to thank Dean Kevin R. 
Johnson, Professor of Law and Chicana/o Studies, and Mabie-Apallas Public Interest Law Chair, 
University of California, Davis, School of Law for his assistance and helpful comments; Cynthia 
Valenzuela, Director of Litigation at the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund 
(MALDEF), and Nancy Ramirez, Western Regional Counsel at MALDEF, for their mentorship, 
guidance, and friendship; and my parents, Jerry and Virginia Campbell, for their love, patience, 
and support. 
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immigrants and their legal and social integration into our society overall.  
However, with the installation of former Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano as 
Secretary of Homeland Security, early indications are that the Obama 
Administration is embracing the immigration policies of the Bush 
Administration, with an emphasis on enforcement-only policies at the federal 
level and the continuing delegation of immigration regulation to state and local 
governments.  This policy not only undermines the principles of immigration 
federalism that is mandated by our Constitution, it further blurs the line 
between federal and state authority to regulate immigration.  As such, any 
attempts to achieve meaningful comprehensive immigration reform will be 
fatal unless Congress and the Executive forcefully reassert the federal 
government’s supremacy over immigration matters. 
This Article argues for the reassertion of Congress’s plenary power to 
regulate immigration, and examines the possibilities for radical change in 
immigration policy that are presented to us as we close out the first decade of 
the twenty-first century and begin looking toward the next. Part I provides an 
overview of the rise of state and local anti-immigrant laws in the wake of 
Congress’s failure to pass comprehensive immigration reform—as well as 
examining how Latinos and immigrants’ rights advocates have worked to 
combat these measures through litigation and other means—and the concurrent 
anti-immigrant sentiment that has gained momentum across the United States 
in recent years.  Part II discusses how the Bush Administration undermined the 
principles of immigration federalism by combining enforcement-only 
immigration policies at the federal level with the improper delegation of other 
aspects of immigration control to states and localities- in particular the 
increasing reliance on the 287(g) program—and how the federal government’s 
reliance on these policies have not only undermined federal supremacy to 
regulate immigration, but has given rise to racial profiling and an increase in 
hate crimes toward immigrants and Latinos. 
Part III discusses Congress’s plenary power to regulate immigration, and 
argues that the political branches must act now to reinforce the principle of 
immigration federalism as a matter of both law and policy.  I argue that 
because the Constitution requires the federal government to maintain a uniform 
system of immigration laws, Congress must act now and enact truly 
comprehensive immigration reform that clearly and forcefully sets limits on 
the ability of state and local governments to regulate immigration.  In 
particular, Congress and the Executive have the power and the ability—and 
indeed, the obligation—to step in and halt the piecemeal enforcement of 
immigration on the state and federal level, thus putting an end to the 
“balkanization” of immigration law that has occurred at a rapid and frightening 
pace over the last several years.  Additionally, by asserting the powers given to 
Congress and the Executive to create and enforce our nation’s immigration 
regulations, the Obama Administration also has the opportunity to stem the 
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tide of anti-immigrant and anti-Latino rhetoric by implementing policies and 
practices at the federal level. 
Finally, Part IV discusses how Congress and the Obama Administration 
can use immigration federalism in a meaningful way to advance the civil and 
human rights of immigrants and citizens alike.  I imagine what our nation 
would look like if our immigration laws embodied a respect for human dignity 
regardless of immigration status, and suggest that Congress should not merely 
amend the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), but that the time is ripe for 
a complete reinvention of American immigration law and policy.  Drawing 
from international law—specifically, the European Union concept of “freedom 
of movement”—I offer suggestions to Congress and the Executive regarding 
the moral and ethical dimensions that should be taken into consideration in the 
exercise of their plenary power to regulate immigration, and posit that 
comprehensive immigration reform in the Obama Administration should 
reflect global, rather than local, concerns surrounding immigration and 
migration in the twenty-first century. 
I.  NO ROOM AT THE INN: THE GROWING HOSTILITY TOWARD IMMIGRANTS IN 
THE FIRST DECADE OF THE 21ST CENTURY 
Congress’s recent attempts to enact comprehensive immigration reform at 
the federal level have been dismal failures.1  Because immigration reform is a 
controversial issue on both sides of the aisle, the House and the Senate were 
unable to craft successful legislation reforming our federal immigration laws, 
even with the support of the Bush Administration.2  The failure of the political 
branches to gain enough votes to pass comprehensive immigration reform has 
resulted in states and localities, in an attempt to push the envelope of the states’ 
historic police powers, to pass their own regulations of immigration in their 
respective jurisdictions.3  Consequently, there has been a proliferation of 
conflicting, and often hostile, laws directed at regulating the lives of 
immigrants in the most mundane aspects of their everyday lives.  From local 
laws prohibiting the rental of property to immigrants on the grounds that doing 
so is “harboring” aliens,4 to state sanctions against employers who are found to 
 
 1. Congress’s most recent attempt to pass comprehensive immigration reform failed to gain 
approval by the Senate in the summer of 2007.  See, e.g., Carolyn Lochhead, Immigrant Bill 
Killed in Divided Senate, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., June 8, 2007, at A1, available at 
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2007/06/08/MNGSVQBV4D1.DTL&hw=immi 
gration+reform&sn=011&sc=247. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See National Immigration Forum, Immigration Law Enforcement by State and Local 
Police, BACKGROUNDER (2007), http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/Back 
grounder-StateLocalEnforcement.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2010). 
 4. Several cities, such as Escondido, California, attempted to prevent undocumented 
persons from renting property in their municipalities by drafting laws that would make doing so a 
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have undocumented immigrants in their employ,5 states and localities have 
taken up the mantle of immigration reform in a way that, I argue, was never 
envisioned by the Framers of the Constitution. 
A. State and Local Anti-Immigrant Ordinances, Statutes, and Ballot 
Initiatives 
1. Omnibus State and Local Anti-Immigrant Laws 
Courts have long recognized that states may have an interest in regulation 
of immigration within their jurisdictions, so long as their attempts to do so do 
not conflict with or frustrate the will of Congress.6  Additionally, it is well-
established that some aspects of the regulation of immigrants—for example, 
employment of undocumented immigrants—falls within the historic police 
powers of the states.7  Thus, while the surge in state and local anti-immigrant 
ordinances in 2006 and 2007 may have seemed to come out of nowhere, these 
laws are in fact only the most recent attempt by state and local governments to 
regulate immigration in a long history of state-federal conflict regarding the 
constitutional limits of immigration federalism. 
Prior to the recent targeting of undocumented immigrants by state and 
local governments, the last time a serious challenge to immigration federalism 
was launched by the states occurred in the 1990s, when California attempted to 
pass a comprehensive state law regulating immigration within its borders, 
Proposition 187.8  However, while Proposition 187 and other late-20th century 
state and local anti-immigrant laws tended to focus on the denial of public 
 
“harboring” offense similar to the federal criminal harboring statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2006).  For 
a further discussion of Escondido, see infra Part I.A.2.a. 
 5. See infra Part I.A.2.b. 
 6. See generally Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration 
Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008) (arguing that local government can and should play an 
important role in the regulation of immigration). 
 7. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976).  Although the holding in De Canas that 
California’s state regulation of the employment of undocumented immigrants has long been 
believed to have been superseded by Congress’s passage of the Immigration Reform and Control 
Act (IRCA) in 1986, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held, relying on De Canas, that 
Arizona may constitutionally regulate the employment of undocumented immigrants through its 
employer sanctions law, as doing so falls within the states’ historic police power.  See Chicanos 
Por La Causa v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d. 856, 864–865 (9th Cir. 2009).  For a further discussion of 
the potential implications of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Chicanos Por La Causa, see infra 
Part III.B 
 8. See California’s Proposition 187, a ballot initiative that was approved by voters 59–41% 
in 1994.  Proposition 187 was ultimately invalidated by a federal court on the grounds that it was 
preempted by federal law.  Proposition 187, 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop 187 (West); See League 
of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 786 (C.D. Cal. 1995). 
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benefits to undocumented immigrants,9 or to restrict access to entitlements 
such as drivers licenses,10 the second generation of proposed anti-immigrant 
laws differ in the respect that they not only attempted to accomplish broader 
regulations of immigration by the states—they also attempted to bring 
regulation of immigration on the sub-federal level into the homes and 
workplaces of cities and towns across America.11 
a. San Bernardino, California 
Although ultimately unsuccessful, the San Bernardino Illegal Immigration 
Relief Act Ordinance12 was the first local ordinance in this new wave of 21st 
century state and local anti-immigrant laws to gain widespread notoriety.  The 
San Bernardino law, which was created by a group calling itself “Save San 
Bernardino” and led by San Bernardino resident Joe Turner,13 took this name 
from the group that backed California’s notorious Proposition 187 in 1994, 
Save Our State.14  Unlike Proposition 187, however, the San Bernardino Illegal 
Immigration Relief Act Ordinance sought to do much more than deny 
undocumented immigrants the ability to receive public benefits—it sought to 
exclude them completely from public life, through a series of draconian 
provisions that would have made it virtually impossible for anyone without 
legal status to live or work in San Bernardino.15 
The San Bernardino Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance was an 
omnibus local ordinance that would have prevented undocumented persons 
from living or working in the City of San Bernardino, with civil and criminal 
penalties for persons in violation of the ordinance.16  The ordinance also 
included an “English-only” provision, which went beyond making English the 
official language of San Bernardino and attempted to penalize persons for 
speaking languages other than English.17  While San Bernardino’s anti-
 
 9. See, e.g., Proposition 187, 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop 187 (West). 
 10. Proof of lawful presence in the United States is required in almost every state in order to 
receive a state-issued driver license or identity card under the REAL ID Act of 2005.  See REAL 
ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005). 
 11. See Rodríguez, supra note 6, at 591. 
 12. San Bernardino, Cal., Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance §§ 4–8 (2006) 
[hereinafter San Bernardino Ordinance], available at http://www.ailadownloads.org/advo/San 
BernardinoIllegalImmigrationOrdinance.pdf. 
 13. See Save San Bernardino!, Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance, http://www.cam 
paignsitebuilder.com/templates/displayfiles/tmpl68.asp?SiteID=843&PageID=12139&Trial=false 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2010). 
 14. See Southern Poverty Law Center, Intelligence Report, The Nativists, Winter 2005, 
http://www.splcenter.org/intel/intelreport/article.jsp?pid=1266 (last visited Feb. 7, 2010). 
 15. See San Bernardino Ordinance, supra note 12. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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immigrant ordinance was ultimately narrowly rejected by the city council,18 
and an attempt to get the law approved as a ballot initiative for consideration 
by voters failed,19 anti-immigrant laws similar to the proposed ordinance in 
San Bernardino soon began to surface all over the country with alarming 
regularity.  These state and local attempts to regulate immigration, and the 
consequences that flowed from the involvement of local law enforcement in 
federal immigration policy, spawned a great deal of controversy both inside 
and outside the courtroom over the next several years.20 
b. Hazleton, Pennsylvania 
Following the defeat of the San Bernardino proposal, the most high-profile 
local omnibus anti-immigrant ordinance to come in its wake was the Hazleton 
Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance,21 which was approved by the 
Hazleton City Council on July 13, 2006.22  The Hazleton Ordinance, which 
was drafted by Hazleton Mayor Lou Barletta, was inspired by the failed 
ordinance in San Bernardino23 and attempted—among other restrictions—to 
prohibit the provision of housing to and employment of undocumented 
immigrants within the City of Hazleton.24  It also contained a “tenant 
registration” provision, which required all persons wishing to rent property in 
Hazleton to obtain an occupancy license,25 an English-only provision,26 and 
civil penalties for violation of the ordinance.27 
 
 18. On May 15, 2006, the San Bernardino City Council rejected the anti-immigrant 
ordinance by a vote of 4-3.  See James Sterngold, San Bernardino Seeking ‘Relief’; Struggling 
City’s Proposal Targets Illegal Immigrants, S.F. CHRON., June 11, 2006, at A-4, available at 
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2006/06/11/MNGM5JCE0B1.DTL&type=po 
litics. 
 19. Superior Court Judge A. Rex Victor determined that not enough signatures had been 
gathered for the proposal to qualify as a ballot initiative.  See Kelly Rayburn, Judge Rejects 
Initiative: Too Few Signatures Gathered for Immigration Measure, SAN BERNARDINO SUN, June 
27, 2006, at B1, available at http://www.sbsun.com/search/ci_3983529. 
 20. See Rigel C. Oliveri, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Landlords, Latinos, Anti-Illegal 
Immigrant Ordinances, and Housing Discrimination, 62 VAND. L. REV. 55, 60 (2009). 
 21. See HAZLETON, PA., ORDINANCE 2006-18 (Sept. 21, 2006), available at 
http://www.smalltowndefenders.com/node/6.  The Hazleton Ordinance was amended several 
times as a result of litigation challenging the ordinance’s constitutionality, which is discussed in 
further detail infra, Part I.B. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See Steve Mocarsky, Hazleton’s Illegal-Immigration Law a Trendsetter, THE TIMES-
LEADER (Wilkes-Barre, Pa.), July 31, 2006, at A1, available at 2006 WLNR 13173977. 
 24. ORDINANCE 2006-18. 
 25. HAZLETON, PA., ORDINANCE 2006-13 (Aug. 15, 2006), http://www.smalltowndefenders. 
com/090806/2006-13%20_Landlord%20Tenant%20Ordinance.pdf. 
 26. HAZLETON, PA., ORDINANCE 2006-19 (Sept. 21, 2006), http://www.smalltowndefenders. 
com/090806/2006-19%20_Official%20English.pdf. 
 27. ORDINANCE 2006-18. 
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Although the Hazleton ordinance was also eventually struck down as 
preempted under federal law,28 dozens of states and localities were quick to 
pick up where Hazleton left off in its attempts to pass comprehensive 
immigration regulations at the state and local level.29  Indeed, another local 
omnibus immigration ordinance—enacted in Valley Park, Missouri30—has 
survived several legal challenges to its constitutionality in both state and 
federal court,31 with devastating impacts on the local immigrant and Latino 
communities.32 
Although cities and towns enacted some of the most dramatic sub-federal 
immigration regulations, they were not the only jurisdictions that recently 
attempted to enact omnibus anti-immigrant laws in excess of their 
constitutional power. Among the states that have passed comprehensive 
statutes regulating immigration within their jurisdictions since 2006 are South 
Carolina,33 Oklahoma,34 and Missouri.35 Though most of these laws have been 
challenged on the grounds that they are preempted by federal law, the litigation 
results have been mixed.36 As such, there is currently far from a uniform 
mandate from either Congress, the Executive, or the federal courts regarding 
the permissibility of such state attempts to regulate immigration and when—or 
 
 28. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 521 (M.D. Pa. 2007).  The District 
Court’s decision was appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals by the defendants.  At the 
time of this writing, the case remained under consideration by the three-judge panel. 
 29. See Oliveri, supra note 20, at 60–61. 
 30. See VALLEY PARK, MO., ORDINANCE 1708 (July 17, 2006), http://www.valleyparkmo. 
org/docs/Ordinances/Ordinance%201708.pdf. 
 31. See infra Part I.B. 
 32. There is a great deal of anecdotal evidence that following the passage of state and local 
anti-immigrant ordinances, Latino residents—both citizens and immigrants—were subject to 
harassment and discrimination on the basis of their perceived immigration status.  See, e.g., 
Valley Park Ordinance Under Fire, KOMU.COM, Nov. 8, 2006, http://www.komu.com/satellite/ 
SatelliteRender/KOMU.com/ba8a4513-c0a8-2f11-0063-9bd94c70b769/c98ea7cd-c0a8-2f11-
0049-ecddeb0673b1 (discussing racial profiling in the wake of the Valley Park ordinance).  There 
is also evidence that because of this racial and ethnic hostility, Latinos began to voluntarily leave 
these jurisdictions—what anti-immigrant activists refer to as “self-deportation.”  See, e.g., Illegal 
Immigrants Fleeing Apartments in Arizona, IMMIGR. CHRON., Jan. 31, 2008, http://blogs.chron. 
com/immigration/archives/2008/01 (discussing the “self-deportation” of immigrants in Arizona 
following the rash of laws targeting immigrants statewide). 
 33. South Carolina Illegal Immigration Reform Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-31-40 (2008), 
available at http://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess117_2007-2008/bills/392.htm. 
 34. See Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 446 (2007), 
available at http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=448995. 
 35. See Missouri Omnibus Immigration Act, S.B. 348, 626 & 461, 94th Gen. Assem., 1st 
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2007), available at http://www.senate.mo.gov/07info/BTS_Web/Bill.aspx? 
SessionType=r&BillID=6818. 
 36. See infra Part I.B. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
422 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIX:415 
if—such statutes do not run afoul of Congress’s plenary power to regulate 
immigration.37 
2. State and Local Laws Regulating Housing and Employment of 
Immigrants 
Less comprehensive in scope than the omnibus attempts to regulate 
immigration -though no less damaging to the immigrant community on a 
practical level—are the state and local attempts to regulate either the housing 
or employment of undocumented immigrants, or both. Although some states, 
such as Tennessee,38 attempted to enact more narrow immigration 
legislation—and several states passed laws mandating the use of E-Verify, the 
federal electronic employment verification program39—most of the laws 
regulating the housing or employment of immigrants have been passed at the 
local level.40 
a. Local Ordinances Regulating the Provision of Housing to 
Undocumented Immigrants 
In 2006, the war being waged on undocumented immigrants hit home—
literally.  Late that year, the city councils in Escondido, California and Farmers 
Branch, Texas, engaged in high-profile attempts to prevent undocumented 
immigrants from being able to rent property from private landlords in their 
cities.41  Both of these ordinances would test the limits of a local government’s 
power to dictate whether and when individuals may rent privately owned 
property to undocumented immigrants, and if restrictions on such activities 
may be regulated consistent with the Immigration and Nationality Act’s (INA) 
harboring provision42 and HUD regulations governing the federally subsidized 
Section 8 housing program.43 
 
 37. See Oliveri, supra note 20, at 60. 
 38. The Tennessee Legislature passed a law imposing sanctions on employers who are found 
to have employed undocumented immigrants.  See TENN. CODE ANN. 50-1-103 (2007) (effective 
Jan. 1, 2008), available at http://www.michie.com/tennessee/lpExt.dll?f=templates&eMail=Y& 
fn=main-h.htm&cp=tncode/1d1ba/1d1c4/1d1cb/1d1dc. 
 39. State laws mandating that all employers participate in E-Verify have been passed by 
Arizona, Mississippi, and South Carolina.  Other states—including Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, 
Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Utah—have passed legislation requiring the 
use of E-Verify for government contractors and other public entities.  As of this writing, 
mandatory E-Verify legislation is pending in Arkansas, Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska, Ohio, and 
Rhode Island.  See NumbersUSA, Map of States with Mandatory E-Verify Laws, 
http://www.numbersusa.com/content/learn/enforcement/workplace-verification/map-states-with-
mandatory-e-verify-laws.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2010) [hereinafter NumbersUSA]. 
 40. See Oliveri, supra note 20, at 60. 
 41. Id. 
 42. 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2006). 
 43. 42 U.S.C. § 1436a (2000) (restriction on use of assisted housing by non-resident aliens). 
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On October 18, 2006, the Republican-majority Escondido City Council 
passed an ordinance that would prevent the “harboring of illegal aliens in the 
City of Escondido”44 by a vote of 3-2.45  The ordinance, which was enjoined 
before it could take effect,46 would have made it unlawful to “let, lease or rent 
a dwelling to an illegal alien” in the City of Escondido.47  The ordinance would 
have also required the city’s Business License Division to verify the lawful 
presence of all tenants in the City of Escondido through the federal Systematic 
Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) database,48 and provided for fines, 
suspension, and revocation of business licenses of landlords who were not in 
compliance with the law.49 
By contrast, the ordinance at issue in Farmers Branch required landlords in 
the City of Farmers Branch to verify the lawful immigration status of their 
individual tenants and to keep records demonstrating that none of their tenants 
were unauthorized aliens.50  The Farmers Branch ordinance also attempted to 
require private landlords to adhere to the requirements set forth by the United 
States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) that persons 
who participate in the federally subsidized housing program known as Section 
8 prove their lawful presence in the United States.51  The Farmers Branch 
ordinance also attempted to impose criminal sanctions of $500 per day for each 
violation of the rental housing ordinance.52 
b. State Employer Sanctions Laws 
State employer sanctions laws are, generally, broader than state laws 
mandating the use of E-Verify, and are therefore not found in as great a 
 
 44. See ESCONDIDO, CA., ORDINANCE 2006-38 R, http://www.cooley.com/files/tbl_s5Site 
Repository/FileUpload21/925/Escondido%20Ordinance.pdf. 
 45. See David Fried, Escondido Council Approves Illegal Immigrant Rental Ban, N. 
COUNTY TIMES (San Diego, Ca.), Oct. 5, 2006, available at http://www.nctimes.com/news/local/ 
article_6e9c96a5-3fed-56bf-ad60-17a22f9954d7.html. 
 46. See infra Part I.B. 
 47. ORDINANCE 2006-38 R. 
 48. The SAVE program was created pursuant to the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359; the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611 & 1621; the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009; and the REAL ID 
Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231.  See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., SAVE 
Governing Laws, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a75 
43f6d1a/?vgnextoid=d013c2ec0c7c8110VgnVCM1000004718190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=d013
c2ec0c7c8110VgnVCM1000004718190aRCRD (last visited Feb. 7, 2010). 
 49. ORDINANCE 2006-38 R. 
 50. CITY OF FARMERS BRANCH, TX., ORDINANCE 2892 § 2 (2006), http://lawprofessors.type 
pad.com/immigration/files/city_of_farmers_branch_ordinance_no_2892_2.pdf. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. § 4. 
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number as the mandatory E-Verify laws.53  Although only a handful of states 
have passed or attempted to pass state laws providing for sanctions against 
employers who are found to “knowingly” employ persons who do not have 
work authorization,54 the states that have done so have generally used the 
threat of sanctions to encourage employers to use E-Verify rather than mandate 
its use.55 
However, the most notorious state employer sanctions law—the Legal 
Arizona Workers Act (LAWA)56—mandates that all employers use E-Verify 
and provides for sanctions for employers who “intentionally” employ persons 
that are not legally authorized to work in the United States.57  Although the 
LAWA does contain a “safe harbor” provision for employers who use E-Verify 
to confirm that their employees are work authorized,58 yet nonetheless discover 
that their employees are may not legally work in the United States, the 
practical effect of the LAWA is that an employer may run afoul of the law by 
not registering for E-Verify, for “intentionally” employing a person without 
work authorization, or both.59 
3. State Anti-Immigrant Ballot Initiatives 
As discussed previously, the first highly-publicized anti-immigrant law 
was Proposition 187, a 1994 California ballot initiative that restricted 
undocumented immigrants’ access to health care, public education, and a 
variety of other social services.60  Like California, the State of Arizona has 
used the ballot initiative process to amend its state constitution to put several 
anti-immigrant laws on the books in the past several years.61  While far from 
 
 53. See NumbersUSA, supra note 39. 
 54. See Kevin R. Lashus et al., Fear the ICE Man: Lessons from the Swift Raids to Warm 
You Up—The New Government Perspective on Employer Sanctions, 32 NOVA. L. REV. 391, 402–
03 (2008). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Legal Arizona Workers Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-211 (1995). 
 57. Id. §§ 23-212, 23-212.01. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Mandatory participation by all Arizona employers in the E-Verify program express 
provisions of the LAWA.  While there are not separate sanctions for not enrolling in the E-Verify 
program, the LAWA mimics the federal employer-sanctions provisions in the respect that 
participation in E-Verify provides employers with a “safe harbor” provision should they 
ultimately be found to have undocumented immigrants in their employ.  See id. §§ 23-214 and 
41-4401. 
 60. See supra notes 8 and 9 and accompanying text. 
 61. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, A Handicapped, Not “Sleeping,” Giant: The 
Devastating Impact of the Initiative Process on Latina/o and Immigrant Communities, 96 CAL. L. 
REV. 1259 (2008) (discussing how ballot initiatives, particularly in California, have targeted 
Latinos and immigrants in recent years and the consequences that have followed). 
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the only state to use the ballot initiative process for this purpose,62 Arizona’s 
frequent use of the ballot initiative process to legislate against immigrants 
exemplifies the “tyranny of the majority” mentality that often prevails in the 
case of state and local anti-immigrant laws. 
a. Arizona Proposition 200 
The first state anti-immigrant ballot initiative to pass in Arizona was 
Proposition 200, which was approved by 56% of the voters on November 2, 
2004.63  This ballot initiative was similar in substance to California’s 
Proposition 187, as its purpose is to prohibit undocumented persons from 
voting and from receiving access to “state and local” public benefits in the 
state of Arizona.64  Proposition 200—which was also known as the Arizona 
 
 62. Id. at 1271–73. 
 63. See National Immigration Forum, 2004 Election Analysis: Arizona’s Proposition 200 
(2004), http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/AZProp200Analysis.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2010). 
 64. See ARIZ. SEC’Y OF STATE, PROPOSITION 200, ARIZONA 2004 BALLOT INITIATIVES 
(Sept. 2004), http://www.azsos.gov/election/2004/info/PubPamphlet/english/prop200.htm (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2010) [hereinafter PROPOSITION 200].  The analysis by legislative council stated: 
  Proposition 200 would require that evidence of United States citizenship be 
presented by every person to register to vote, that proof of identification be presented by 
every voter at the polling place prior to voting, that state and local governments verify the 
identity of all applicants for certain public benefits and that government employees report 
United States immigration law violations by applicants for public benefits. 
  Proposition 200 provides that for purposes of registering to vote, satisfactory 
evidence of United States citizenship includes: - an Arizona driver or nonoperating 
identification license issued after October 1, 1996.  - a driver or nonoperating 
identification license issued by another state if the license indicates that the person has 
provided proof of United States citizenship.  - a copy of the applicant’s birth certificate.  - 
a United States passport, or a copy of the pertinent pages of the passport.  - United States 
naturalization documents or a verified certificate of naturalization number.  - a Bureau of 
Indian Affairs card number, tribal treaty card number or tribal enrollment number.  - other 
documents or methods of proof that may be established by the federal government for the 
purpose of verifying employment eligibility. 
  The county recorder shall indicate this information in the person’s permanent voter 
file for at least two years.  A voter registration card from another county or state does not 
constitute satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship.  A person who is registered 
to vote on the date that Proposition 200 becomes effective is not required to submit 
evidence of citizenship unless the person moves to a different county.  Once a person has 
submitted sufficient evidence of citizenship, the person is not required to resubmit the 
evidence when making changes to voter registration information in the county where the 
evidence has been submitted. 
  Proposition 200 requires that prior to receiving a ballot at a polling place, a voter 
must present either one form of identification that contains the name, address and 
photograph of the person or two different forms of identification that contain the name 
and address of the person. 
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Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act65—was ultimately enacted as Arizona 
Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 46-140.01.  The law subsequently survived a 
challenge to its constitutionality by community and civil rights groups in the 
United States District Court for the District of Arizona,66 and the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals later dismissed the plaintiffs appeal for want of jurisdiction.67  
The Arizona Attorney General, Terry Goddard, also issued an advisory opinion 
regarding the constitutionality of Proposition 200, concluding that the portions 
of the law prohibiting the receipt of “state and local public benefits” by 
undocumented persons were likely constitutional, so long as implementation of 
the state statute was limited to conform with the federal restrictions on public 
benefits for undocumented persons.68 
Another key element of Proposition 200 was the voter identification and 
citizenship verification provisions, which required all persons to prove their 
United States citizenship at the time they registered to vote and to display 
 
  Proposition 200 requires that a state or local governmental entity that is responsible 
for administering “state and local public benefits that are not federally mandated” must: - 
verify the identity and eligibility for each applicant for the public benefits.  - provide other 
state and local government employees with information to verify immigration status of 
applicants applying for public benefits and must also assist other state and local 
government employees in obtaining immigration status information from federal 
immigration authorities.  - refuse to accept any state or local government identification 
card, including a driver license, to establish identity or eligibility for public benefits 
unless the governmental entity that issued the card has verified the immigration status of 
the applicant.  - require all state and local government employees to make a written report 
to federal immigration authorities upon discovering a violation of federal immigration 
laws by an applicant for public benefits.  An employee or supervisor who fails to make 
the required report is guilty of a class 2 misdemeanor, potentially punishable by a jail 
sentence of up to 4 months and a fine of up to $750, plus applicable surcharges. 
  Any resident of this state would have standing to bring a court action against the 
state, a local governmental entity or an agent of a state or local governmental entity to 
remedy a violation of the public benefits verification law including bringing an action to 
compel a government official to comply with the law. 
  Proposition 200 does not define the term “state and local public benefits that are not 
federally mandated.” 
Id. 
 65. The group that was the drafter and major proponent of Proposition 200, Protect Arizona 
Now, gathered signatures for the Proposition 200 ballot initiative under this name. 
 66. See Friendly House v. Napolitano, CV 04-649 TUC DCB (D. Ariz. Dec. 22, 2004). 
 67. See Friendly House v. Napolitano, 419 F.3d 930, 932 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the 
record revealed no case or controversy between the plaintiffs and the State of Arizona). 
 68. Following an analysis of the statutory language of Proposition 200 and the federal law 
restricting public benefits to undocumented aliens, Arizona Attorney General Goddard stated that 
“[The programs] subject to Proposition 200 are those within Title 46 that are subject to eligibility 
restrictions in 8 U.S.C. § 1621.”  Op. Att’y Gen. No. I04-010 (R04-036) (Nov. 12, 2004), 
http://www.azag.gov/opinions/2004/I04-010.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2010). 
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state-issued identification upon voting.69  Like the public benefits portions of 
the law, the voter identification requirements of Proposition 200 were 
unsuccessfully challenged in federal court, and remain requirements for voting 
in Arizona to this day.70 
b. Arizona Proposition 100 
The fall of 2006 gave rise to a trio of anti-immigrant ballot initiatives in 
the State of Arizona—Propositions 100, 102, and 300.71  Arguably the most 
damaging of these ballot initiatives is Proposition 100, which amended the 
Arizona Constitution to provide that undocumented persons charged with 
enumerated felonies are ineligible for bail.72  Although the language of the 
ballot initiative was ultimately amended because of vagueness concerns,73 
 
 69. See PROPOSITION 200, supra note 64. 
 70. See Gonzalez v. Arizona, 485 F.3d 1041, 1043–44 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 71. See ARIZ. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 2006 BALLOT PROPOSITIONS ANALYSES, 
http://www.azleg.state.az.us/2006_Ballot_Proposition_Analyses (providing links to Propositions 
100, 102, and 300) (last visited Aug. 13, 2010). 
 72. See ARIZ. SEC’Y OF STATE, 2006 BALLOT PROPOSITIONS AND JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 
REVIEW–PROPOSITION 100, http://www.azsos.gov/election/2006/Info/pubpamphlet/english/Prop 
100.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2010).  The Proposition 100 ballot-initiative language that was 
approved by voters read in part: 
Be it resolved by the House of Representatives of the State of Arizona, the Senate 
concurring: 
 Article II, section 22, Constitution of Arizona, is proposed to be amended as 
follows if approved by the voters and on proclamation of the Governor: 
 22. Bailable offenses 
 Section 22. A.  All persons charged with crime shall be bailable by sufficient 
sureties, except for: . . . 
  4. FOR SERIOUS FELONY OFFENSES AS PRESCRIBED BY THE 
LEGISLATURE IF THE PERSON CHARGED HAS ENTERED OR REMAINED IN 
THE UNITED STATES ILLEGALLY AND IF THE PROOF IS EVIDENT OR THE 
PRESUMPTION GREAT AS TO THE PRESENT CHARGE. . . . 
  The Secretary of State shall submit this proposition to the voters at the next general 
election as provided by article XXI, Constitution of Arizona. 
Id. 
 73. The Legislature defined serious felony offenses and further clarified this exception in 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3961 (2001) to read: 
  13-3961.  Offenses not bailable; purpose; preconviction; exceptions 
  A.  A person who is in custody shall not be admitted to bail if the proof is evident or 
the presumption great that the person is guilty of the offense and the offense charged is 
either: 
 1. A capital offense. 
 2. Sexual assault. 
 3. Sexual conduct with a minor who is under fifteen years of age. 
 4. Molestation of a child who is under fifteen years of age. 
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Proposition 100 was eventually implemented as an amendment to Article II, § 
22 of the Arizona Constitution74 and Arizona Revised Statute § 39-3961 
(“A.R.S. § 39-3961).75 
Although Proposition 100 amended the Arizona Constitution—and is 
therefore applicable statewide—enforcement of the state law requiring 
undocumented persons charged with a Class 4 felony or better be held non-
bondable has disproportionately occurred in Maricopa County.76  Maricopa 
County, which is home to more than half of the state population, includes 
within its jurisdiction the state’s largest city and capital, Phoenix.77  Maricopa 
County is also home to the notorious Sheriff Joe Arpaio—the self-proclaimed 
“America’s Toughest Sheriff”78—and County Attorney Andrew Thomas, who 
helped draft Proposition 100.79  The combined efforts of these two law 
enforcement officers in Maricopa County has led to vigorous—and some 
would say unconstitutional80—enforcement of Arizona’s state laws targeting 
immigrants, with Proposition 100 emerging as, and remaining,81 an effective 
tool in their arsenal.82 
 
 5. A serious felony offense if the person has entered or remained in the United 
States illegally.  For the purposes of this paragraph . . . (b) “serious felony offense” 
means any class 1, 2, 3 or 4 felony or any violation of section 28-1383. 
 74. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 22. 
 75. § 13-3961. 
 76. See Joanna Dodder Nellans, Day 4: Courts Work Through Prop. 100 Bail Issues, THE 
DAILY COURIER (Prescott, Ariz.), Nov. 28, 2007, available at http://www.dcourier.com/ 
main.asp?SectionID=74&SubSectionID=516&ArticleID=50100&TM=15120.5. 
 77. See ARIZ. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PROFILE: MARICOPA COUNTY, ARIZONA, Dec. 2009, 
http://www.azcommerce.com/doclib/COMMUNE/Maricopa%20County.pdf. 
 78. SHERIFF JOE ARPAIO WITH LEN SHERMAN, AMERICA’S TOUGHEST SHERIFF: HOW WE 
CAN WIN THE WAR AGAINST CRIME (1996) (Sheriff Joe Arpaio’s 1996 autobiography). 
 79. See Nellans, supra note 76. 
 80. The Arizona Court of Appeals has held that Proposition 100 is not unconstitutional.  See 
Segura v. Cunanan, 196 P.3d 831, 835–36 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).  But see Complaint for 
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Lopez-Valenzuela v. 
Maricopa County, No. 2:08-cv-00660 (D. Ariz. April 4, 2008), available at http://bibdaily.com/ 
pdfs/Lopez-Valenzuela%204-4-08.pdf (a separate challenge to the law’s constitutionality 
currently pending before Judge Susan R. Bolton.) [hereinafter Lopez-Valenzuela Complaint]; 
Michael Kiefer, Groups Sue, Challenge Prop. 100, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Apr. 8, 2008, at B1, 
available at http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2008/04/08/20080408aclu0408.html. 
 81. Although the constitutional challenge to Proposition 100 that is currently pending in the 
District of Arizona survived a motion to dismiss by the defendants was certified as a class in 
December 2008, the plaintiffs did not seek preliminary injunctive relief prohibiting enforcement 
of the law during the pendency of the litigation.  See Lopez-Valenzuela Complaint, supra note 81.  
Therefore, at the time of this writing, hundreds—if not thousands—of alleged noncitizens are 
being held without bond pursuant to Proposition 100. 
 82. Andrew Thomas has touted Proposition 100 as one of his major accomplishments as 
Maricopa County Attorney as part of his exploratory run for Governor of Arizona in 2010.  See, 
e.g., ANDREW THOMAS FOR ATTORNEY GEN. EXPLORATORY COMM., FIGHTING FOR CHANGE: A 
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c. Arizona Proposition 102 
One of the most puzzling anti-immigrant laws to be enacted through ballot 
initiative in 2006 was Arizona’s Proposition 102, which provides that 
undocumented persons may not receive an award of punitive damages as the 
result of a civil suit brought in the state of Arizona.83  To date, the law has not 
been challenged on constitutional grounds, though it has been raised as a 
defense to a punitive damages claim in a civil rights lawsuit brought against a 
southern Arizona rancher who violated the civil rights of individuals on his 
property he believe to be undocumented immigrants.84  However, the fact that 
such a seemingly unnecessary law was even conceived of—much less 
approved with 74.2% of Arizonans voting “yes”85—exemplifies the anti-
immigrant hysteria and the antipathy toward undocumented persons in the state 
of Arizona in general. 
d. Arizona Proposition 300 
Because individuals without lawful status may not become residents of the 
states in which they reside for purposes of receiving benefits—such as in-state 
tuition at state colleges and universities—many states have passed laws that 
allow undocumented students who meet certain qualifications to receive out-
of-state tuition waivers.86  With the passage of Proposition 300,87 however, 
 
RECORD OF RESULTS, http://www.thomasforagexploratory.com/Record.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 
2010). 
 83. See ARIZ. SEC’Y OF STATE, 2006 BALLOT PROPOSITIONS AND JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 
REVIEW, PROPOSITION 102, Sept. 2006, http://www.azsos.gov/election/2006/Info/PubPamphlet/ 
english/Prop102.htm.  The 2006 ballot initiative, in its entirety, read: 
  Be it resolved by the Senate of the State of Arizona, the House of Representatives 
concurring: 
  1. Article II, Constitution of Arizona, is proposed to be amended by adding section 
35 as follows if approved by the voters and on proclamation of the Governor: 
 35. Actions by illegal aliens prohibited 
 A PERSON WHO IS PRESENT IN THIS STATE IN VIOLATION OF 
FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAW RELATED TO IMPROPER ENTRY BY AN 
ALIEN SHALL NOT BE AWARDED PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ANY ACTION 
IN ANY COURT IN THIS STATE. 
  2. The Secretary of State shall submit this proposition to the voters at the next 
general election as provided by article XXI, Constitution of Arizona. 
 84. See Jerry Seper, 16 Illegals Sue Arizona Rancher, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2009, at A03, 
available at 2009 WLNR 2542937. 
 85. See ARIZ. SEC’Y OF STATE, 2006 GENERAL ELECTION PROPOSITION 102, 
http://www.azsos.gov/results/2006/general/BM102.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2010). 
 86. See Michael A. Olivas, Lawmakers Gone Wild? College Residency and the Response to 
Professor Kobach, 61 SMU L. REV. 99, 106 (2008). 
 87. See ARIZ. SEC’Y OF STATE, 2006 BALLOT PROPOSITIONS AND JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 
REVIEW, PROPOSITION 300, Sept. 2006, http://www.azsos.gov/election/2006/info/PubPamphlet/ 
english/Prop300.htm. 
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Arizona took the opposite approach, and made undocumented persons 
categorically ineligible to pay in-state tuition at state colleges and 
universities.88 
Proposition 300 amended Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 15-191.01, 15-232, 
15-1803, 46-801 and 46-803, and added § 15-1825.89  Like Proposition 200, 
the amendments under Proposition 300 were styled as a denial of public 
benefits to persons without lawful immigration status.90  Unlike other state 
laws regarding in-state tuition for undocumented persons, however, the 
Arizona statute takes it a step further and also prohibits undocumented persons 
from participating in adult education classes, such as English as a Second 
Language (ESL).91 
Although there is little empirical data on the effects of Proposition 300 on 
undocumented students in Arizona, there is anecdotal evidence suggesting that 
while the law has allowed the state of Arizona to receive some additional 
revenue by charging undocumented students out-of-state tuition, the law has 
also had the effect of denying an education to bright young people because of 
the prohibitive costs associated with obtaining higher education.92 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id.  The amendments that comprised Proposition 300 were specifically referred to as 
“relating to public program eligibility.”  Id. 
 90. Id.  The section S 15-1825 was added to the Arizona Revised Statutes as a result of the 
passage of Proposition 300. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-1825 (2007) reads in its entirety: 
  § 15-1825: Prohibited financial assistance; report 
  A.  A person who is not a citizen of the united states, who is without lawful 
immigration status and who is enrolled as a student at any university under the jurisdiction 
of the Arizona board of regents or at any community college under the jurisdiction of a 
community college district in this state is not entitled to tuition waivers, fee waivers, 
grants, scholarship assistance, financial aid, tuition assistance or any other type of 
financial assistance that is subsidized or paid in whole or in part with state monies. 
  B.  Each community college and university shall report on December 31 and June 30 
of each year to the joint legislative budget committee the total number of students who 
applied and the total number of students who were not entitled to tuition waivers, fee 
waivers, grants, scholarship assistance, financial aid, tuition assistance or any other type 
of financial assistance that is subsidized or paid in whole or in part with state monies 
under this section because the student was not a citizen or legal resident of the united 
states or not lawfully present in the united states. 
  C.  This section shall be enforced without regard to race, religion, gender, ethnicity 
or national origin. 
 91. § 15-232(B), (C). 
 92. See Jonathan J. Cooper, Many Still Apply for Benefits in Spite of Proposition 300, ARIZ. 
DAILY STAR, Aug. 10, 2009, at A13, available at http://azstarnet.com/news/state-and-regional/ 
article_f97febae-46cd-5ebc-8723-ba318dac8596.html. 
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e. Arizona’s State Human Smuggling Law 
Another statewide law targeting undocumented immigrants is the Arizona 
State Human Smuggling Statute.93  Although the legislative history indicates 
that the Arizona Legislature may have intended the state human smuggling law 
to apply only to the coyotes (smugglers),94 the law has been interpreted by 
Maricopa County Attorney Andrew Thomas to include in the statutory 
definition of “conspiracy to commit human smuggling” the smugglees 
themselves.95  This application of the conspiracy statute, while controversial, 
has withstood legal challenges in Arizona state courts.96 
Perhaps the most damaging aspect of the Arizona state human smuggling 
statute is the fact that Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio has seized on the 
statute as independent justification for his “crime suppression” sweeps, 
separate and apart from his agreement with DHS pursuant to INA § 287(g).97  
Based on this interpretation of the state human smuggling state, Sheriff Arpaio 
contends that his deputies may continue to question individuals about their 
immigration status, even though DHS recently revoked Maricopa County’s 
task-force MOA under §287(g).98  As such, it appears that unless and until the 
Arizona Legislature amends the state human smuggling law to specifically 
prohibit charging smuggled persons with conspiracy to smuggle themselves—
an amendment which has already been attempted, and failed99—local law 
 
 93. § 13-2319. 
 94. See H.B. 2539, 47th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2007) (statement of Rep. Paton, Member, 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, Feb. 10, 2005 minutes, at 3) (statements evidencing an intent on 
the part of the legislature to criminalize only the actions of the coyotes—those who profit from 
human smuggling—and not the persons who are smuggled). 
 95. A person is guilty of conspiracy to commit human smuggling under Arizona law if: 1) 
“with the intent to promote or aid” human smuggling; 2) he agrees with one or more persons that 
at least one of them or another person will; 3) intentionally transport or procure the transport of a 
person who is not a United States citizen, permanent resident alien, or otherwise lawfully in 
Arizona; 4) for profit or commercial purpose; 5) while knowing or having reason to know that the 
person being transported is not a United States citizen, permanent resident alien, or otherwise 
lawfully in Arizona; and 6) one of the parties commits an overt act in furtherance of the offense.  
§§ 13-1003(A); 13-2319(A), (D)(2). 
 96. See, e.g., State v. Juan Barragan-Sierra, 196 P.3d 879 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008); see also 
Amanda Lee Myers, AZ Court: Immigrants Subject to Smuggling Law, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, July 17, 
2008, available at 7/17/08 APALERTAZ 23:06:33. 
 97. See, e.g., Caleb Groos, Arpaio Immigration Raids Continue: Under What Authority, 
FINDLAW BLOTTER, Oct. 16, 2009, http://blogs.findlaw.com/blotter/2009/10/arpaio-immigration-
raids-continue-under-what-authority.html. 
 98. See JJ Hensley, Sheriff Arpaio May Lose Some Immigrant Authority, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, 
Oct. 3, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/2009/ 
10/03/20091003arpaio-ice1003.html. 
 99. In 2007, the Arizona Legislature defeated in committee two bills that would have 
eliminated the application of conspiracy and other preparatory offenses under the human 
smuggling statute to the persons being smuggled.  See H.B. 2270 and 2271, 48th Leg., 1st Reg. 
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enforcement in Maricopa County will continue to use the statute not as a 
vehicle for assisting trafficked persons, but as a mechanism for pretextual 
traffic stops and racial profiling. 
f. Pending Anti-Immigrant Legislation and Ballot Initiatives 
While the initial fervor by states and municipalities to pass local laws 
regulating immigration has died down considerably over the past several 
years,100 the threat is far from over. Russell Pearce, the Arizona state senator 
who authored and sponsored the majority of the anti-immigrant laws that have 
made their way through the Arizona legislature since 2006,101 continues to 
draft and propose state laws that target undocumented persons and criminalize 
their every day behavior.102  Currently, Senator Pearce has indicated his 
intention to attempt for a third time to criminalize unlawful presence in 
Arizona as a trespass—despite strong indications that such a law is 
unconstitutional103—and to outlaw solicitation by day laborers statewide.104  
 
Sess. (Ariz. 2007), http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/48leg/1r/bills/hb2270p.pdf and http://www.az 
leg.gov/legtext/48leg/1r/bills/hb2271p.pdf. 
 100. At the peak of state and local government attempts to pass sub-federal immigration 
regulations in 2007, state legislators in 50 states introduced 1,059 immigration-related bills and 
resolutions, or which 167 were enacted into law.  See LAUREEN LAGLAGARON ET AL., 
MIGRATION POLICY INST., REGULATING IMMIGRATION AT THE STATE LEVEL: HIGHLIGHTS 
FROM THE DATABASE OF 2007 STATE IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION AND THE METHODOLOGY 3 
(Oct. 2008), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/2007methodology.pdf. 
 101. See Day to Day: Arizona Voters Face Immigration Initiatives (NPR radio broadcast Oct. 
31, 2006), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6411513. 
 102. For example, Senator Pearce has repeatedly sponsored a bill that would make unlawful 
presence in the State of Arizona a criminal trespass under state law.  See Press Release, Ariz. 
State Senate, Senate Committee Passes Illegal Immigration Bill that Requires Interagency 
Enforcement, Makes Trespassing by Illegal Immigrants a Crime (June 11, 2009), 
http://www.russellpearce.com/archives/newsletters/1175.htm.  Such bills have passed the Arizona 
legislature twice, and were twice vetoed by former Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano.  See 
Jacques Billeaud, Arizona House Rejects Immigration Enforcement Bill, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, July 
1, 2009, available at 7/1/09 APALERTAZ 12:49:54. 
 103. In 2005, New Hampshire attempted to pass a law that would have made illegal presence 
in the state a criminal trespass.  The law was challenged on constitutional grounds and enjoined 
by a state court before it could take effect.  See New Hampshire v. Barros-Batistele et. al., No. 05-
CR-1474, 1475, slip op. (Nashua D. Ct. 2005), available at http://www.courts.state.nh.us/district/ 
orders/criminal_trespass_decision.pdf. 
 104. See JENNIFER ALLEN, BORDER ACTION NETWORK, ARIZONA LEGISLATURE AGAIN 
SEEKS TO CRIMINALIZE DAY LABORERS, HB2355 PASSES THE HOUSE COW (May 21, 2009), 
http://www.borderaction.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=138%3Aari
zona-legislature-again-seeks-to-criminalize-day-laborers-hb2355-passes-the-house-cow&catid= 
43%3Aarizona-legislature&Itemid=143&lang=en.  SB 1070, which was signed into law in April 
2010, includes a section prohibiting the solicitation of employment by undocumented persons 
statewide.  See SB 1070, Section 5, which amends Title 13, chapter 29, Arizona Revised Statutes 
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Senator Pearce has also indicated that if these proposals fail in the legislature, 
or are vetoed by Governor Jan Brewer, he will seek to get them approved as 
ballot initiatives in November 2010.105 
Another anti-immigrant ballot initiative that poses a serious threat in the 
2010 election is currently gathering signatures in California.  The California 
Taxpayer Protection Act of 2010,106 like Proposition 187 before it, seeks to 
make undocumented persons ineligible for public benefits in the state of 
California.107  However, the California Taxpayer Protection Act contains a new 
and frightening attempt to limit the rights of undocumented persons by 
targeting their United States citizen children, referring to the births of such 
children as “birth tourism.”108  Drafted by an anti-immigrant organization in 
San Diego, Taxpayer Revolution,109 the Taxpayer Protection Act attempts to 
reinterpret the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution by 
stating that children born to undocumented persons are not birthright citizens 
because their parents are not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United 
States.110  If passed, the law would not permit children born in the United 
States to undocumented parents to receive birth certificates, but would instead 
require California to issue certificates noting a birth to a “foreign parent.”111  
The law would also require the mother of the child to be fingerprinted, 
photographed, and have her personal information transmitted to the 
Department of Homeland Security,112 presumably in order to assist with 
federal immigration enforcement. 
Although it seems radical, this interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
has been floated by immigration restrictionists before,113 and this is not the first 
 
by adding sections 13-2928 and 13-2929, http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/49leg/2r/bills/sb10 
70s.pdf. 
 105. See Matthew Benson, Immigration Foes Pledge New Bill, Voter Initiative, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC, Oct. 22, 2009, at B1, available at 2009 WLNR 20939214. 
 106. The full text of the proposed ballot initiative is available at http://www.taxpayer 
revolution.org, the website of the group Taxpayer Revolution, which drafted the proposal and is 
gathering signatures in support of the initiative.  See CALIFORNIA TAXPAYER PROTECTION ACT, 
TAXPAYER REVOLUTION, http://www.taxpayerrevolution.org (last visited Feb. 9, 2010) 
[hereinafter TAXPAYER REVOLUTION]. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See AN INITIATIVE TO HELP CALIFORNIA’S BUDGET DEFICIT CRISIS: CALIFORNIA 
TAXPAYER PROTECTION ACT BORDER CONTROL BY STOPPING THE MAGNETS, TAXPAYER 
REVOLUTION, http://www.taxpayerrevolution.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view& 
id=2&Itemid=2 (last visited Feb. 9, 2010). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Prominent immigration restriction groups, such as the Federation for American 
Immigration Reform (FAIR), have long contended that the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
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time such a provision has been considered for approval by voters as part of a 
ballot initiative.114  Should the Taxpayer Protection Act gain approval by 
California voters, and amend the California Constitution to redefine birthright 
citizenship in the manner proposed by the initiative, there will almost certainly 
be a constitutional challenge to the law—which, it appears, is exactly what the 
supporters of the law are hoping for.115  As of November 2009, the 
organization indicated that a new petition would be available on its website for 
signature gathering in January 2010.116 
B. Litigation Responses to State and Local Anti-Immigrant Laws 
Predictably, there has been a proliferation of litigation in both state and 
federal court challenging the constitutionality of the sub-federal immigration 
restrictions.117  Perhaps also predictably, the success of this litigation has been 
mixed.118  The main legal theory used to challenge these laws—federal 
preemption—has been generally successful in the housing context, but the 
challenges to state and local regulations of employment of aliens have been 
less successful.119  The Hazleton and Arizona cases, which are the two major 
 
States Constitution does not confer birthright citizenship on the children of parents who are not 
lawfully present in the United States at the time of the child’s birth.  See, e.g., A FAIR Review . . .  
The 14th Amendment Debate, IMMIGRATION REPORT (Fed’n for Am. Immigr. Reform, 
Washington, D.C.), Apr. 2005, http://www.fairus.org/site/PageServer?pagename=research_ 
research65c8.  See also EDWARD ERLER, THE HERITAGE FOUND., BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP AND 
THE CONSTITUTION (Dec. 1, 2005), http://www.heritage.org/Research/GovernmentReform/ 
wm925.cfm. 
 114. Perhaps unsurprisingly, a similar ballot initiative was proposed in Arizona in 2007, 
though it failed to gather enough signatures to be placed on the ballot in the 2008 election.  See 
Measures Target Citizenship for Migrants’ Kids, TUCSON CITIZEN, Dec. 3, 2007, 
http://www.tucsoncitizen.com/daily/local/70521.php. 
 115. See The Pat Morrison Show: New Ballot Initiative Takes Aim at Illegal Immigrants 
(KPCC Southern California Public Radio broadcast July 13, 2009), available at 
http://www.scpr.org/programs/patt-morrison/2009/07/13/new-ballot-initiative-takes-aim-at-il 
legal-immigra. 
 116. See TAXPAYER REVOLUTION, supra note 106. 
 117. See generally STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT, THE AM IMMIGR. LAW FOUND. 
http://www.ailf.org/lac/clearinghouse_120706.shtml (last visited Feb. 9, 2010). 
 118. Id. 
 119. There is currently a split of authority in both the federal district courts and circuit courts 
of appeal on the issue of whether such laws are preempted under federal law.  The Escondido and 
Farmers Branch ordinances, which were both local immigration housing ordinances, were 
enjoined by federal courts on the grounds that they are preempted by federal immigration law.  
See supra Part I.  However, in the employment context, there are split decisions out of the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania and the District of Arizona regarding whether the revocation of state 
business licenses as a penalty for employing undocumented workers is preempted as a “licensing 
or similar law” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(h)(2).  See Chicanos Por La Causa v. 
Napolitano, 558 F.3d. 856, 860–61 (9th Cir. 2009); see infra Part III. 
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decisions interpreting whether states may regulate the employment of 
undocumented persons by imposing sanctions on businesses—such as the 
revocation of state business licenses—have offered contradictory views on 
Congress’s intent regarding the scope of states’ authority in this area.120  
Therefore, unless Congress sees fit to clarify its meaning regarding when and 
how states may regulate immigration through “licensing or similar laws,”121—
or the United States Supreme Court resolves the split of authority interpreting 
this provision122—the ongoing litigation challenging the constitutionality of 
these state and local immigration regulations seems unlikely to put a rest to 
these issues any time soon.123 
II.  THE RISE OF ENFORCEMENT-ONLY IMMIGRATION POLICIES: §287(G), 
RACIAL PROFILING, ICE RAIDS, AND THE INCREASE OF HATE CRIMES AGAINST 
IMMIGRANTS AND LATINOS 
At the heart of my argument that Congress and the Executive have failed to 
meaningfully assert their plenary power to regulate immigration is the 
delegation of federal immigration enforcement powers by Congress to state 
law enforcement agencies through the enactment of INA § 287(g).124  I argue 
 
 120. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 459 F. Supp. 2d. 332, 338 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (holding that 
local employer sanctions ordinance could be unlawful); Arizona Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. 
Candelaria, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1046 (D. Ariz. 2008) (holding that state employer sanctions 
law falls within the savings clause of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(h)(2) and is therefore not expressly 
preempted). 
 121. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006). 
 122. The plaintiffs in Chicanos Por La Causa filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to 
review the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals with the United States Supreme Court 
in July 2009.  See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et. al. v. Candelaria, No. 
09-115 (U.S. July 24, 2009), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/ 
2009/10/09-115_pet.pdf.  On November 2, 2009, the Court asked the Solicitor General to provide 
a brief expressing the views of the United States on this issue.  See Josh Gerstein, Supreme Court 
Query Puts Janet Napolitano on the Spot, POLITICO, Nov. 6, 2009, http://www.politico.com/ 
news/stories/1109/29222.html. 
 123. In addition to the cases on review by the Third and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals, 
challenges to local immigration regulations have also been considered by the Eighth and Tenth 
Circuit Courts of Appeals, and the issue is likely to eventually reach the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, as well.  See Gray v. City of Valley Park, 567 F.3d 976, 985–87 (8th Cir. 2009) 
(upholding constitutionality of local anti-immigrant ordinance); Chamber of Commerce of the 
United States v. Henry, No. CIV-08-109-C, 2008 WL 2329164, at *6–7 (W.D. Okla. June 4, 
2008) (preliminarily enjoining statewide anti-immigrant law, H.B. 1804) (oral argument 
appealing the district court’s decision in the 10th Circuit held June 2009); Villas at Parkside 
Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 577 F. Supp. 2d 851, 856 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (permanently 
enjoining anti-immigrant housing ordinance). 
 124. Although almost always referred to simply by its code section in the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA), the proper title of § 287(g) is “Acceptance of State Services to Carry Out 
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that if the Obama Administration is serious about accomplishing 
comprehensive immigration reform in the near future, the first thing President 
Obama must do is immediately enact a moratorium on the 287(g) program and 
recommend that Congress repeal the statute in its entirety.  In support of that 
argument, this section describes in some detail the history and substantive 
provisions of the 287(g) program, and discusses the federal government’s 
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)125 with Maricopa County, Arizona, to 
demonstrate a few of the myriad problems that arise from this form of 
delegation of immigration enforcement to sub-federal law enforcement 
entities.126 
A. Delegation of Immigration Responsibilities to Local Law Enforcement 
Pursuant to INA § 287(g) 
Under INA 287(g), there are two models by which local law enforcement 
officials may enforce federal immigration law.127  The first is the task-force 
model, which allows for enforcement of civil immigration law in connection 
with routine law enforcement activities (such as traffic stops).128  The second is 
the jail model, in which Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials 
check the immigration status of persons who are booked into local jails in 
connection with an arrest pursuant to a violation of state or local law.129  
Although I will discuss each model separately, DHS has the authority to enter 
into agreements with local law enforcement agencies pursuant to both of these 
models, and they often do.130 
 
Immigration Enforcement.”  Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. 
L. No. 104-208, § 133, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-563 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357). 
 125. Jurisdictions that enter into 287(g) agreements with the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) sign a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with DHS.  Previously, these 
agreements were referred to as Memorandums of Understanding (MOU), and though the name 
has changed, the form and substance of these agreements remain largely the same.  See 
Memorandum of Agreement between United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement and 
Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (2009), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/memorandumsofAgree 
mentUnderstanding/r_287gmaricopacountyso102609.pdf. 
 126. For a detailed examination of the particular concerns of the Maricopa County 287(g) 
program, see AARTI SHAHANI & JUDITH GREENE, JUSTICE STRATEGIES, LOCAL DEMOCRACY ON 
ICE: WHY STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS HAVE NO BUSINESS IN FEDERAL IMMIGRATION 
LAW ENFORCEMENT (Feb. 2009), http://www.justicestrategies.org/2009/local-democracy-ice-
why-state-and-local-governments-have-no-business-federal-immigration-law-en. 
 127. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. 1357 (2006). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See, e.g., Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 126 (entering into an agreement with 
the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office under both the task-force and jail models).  In October 
2009, DHS chose not to renew its task-force model agreement with the Maricopa County 
Sheriff’s Office, opting instead to only authorize participation in the jail model in Maricopa 
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1. The Task-Force Model 
Under the 287(g) task-force model, local law enforcement officers are 
cross-deputized as ICE officers and authorized to perform limited immigration 
enforcement functions in connection with their routine enforcement of state 
and local law.131  Local law enforcement officers that are cross-deputized 
pursuant to the 287(g) program also receive extra training regarding 
immigration law and its enforcement, and are subject to the same rules and 
regulations as regular ICE officials, although they are primarily supervised by 
the local law enforcement agency and not DHS.132 
The task-force model has led to a great deal of variation in the enforcement 
of immigration laws across jurisdictions that have entered into agreements with 
DHS pursuant to § 287(g).133  Because of the lack of oversight by DHS, the 
implementation of the provisions of the MOA has been left to local law 
enforcement agencies and has resulted in allegations of improper questioning 
of immigration status without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, and 
racial profiling of Latinos and other individuals whom local law enforcement 
believe may be “foreign.”134  As such, in jurisdictions that have agreements 
with DHS pursuant to the task-force model, the practical effect has been the 
impression—if not the fact135—that all local law enforcement officers are also 
ICE agents, and the impact on public safety has been disastrous.136 
 
County.  See Brent Johnson, Sheriff Joe Stripped of Powers, IMMIGRATION LAW REFORM BLOG, 
Oct. 6, 2009, http://immigrationlawreformblog.blogspot.com/2009/10/sherriff-joe-stripped-of-
powers.html. 
 131. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(g). 
 132. See SHAHANI & GREENE, supra note 126, at 4. 
 133. Id. at 13. 
 134. Id. at 3.  Although Maricopa County is the most notorious example of a local law 
enforcement agency enforcing immigration laws beyond the scope of their MOA with DHS, other 
jurisdictions have been accused of improperly using their agency’s § 287(g) agreement in ways 
that have led to allegations of racial profiling and improper detentions.  See, e.g., Prayer Vigil 
Community Opposition to 287(g) Program, TENN. IMMIGRANT AND REFUGEE RIGHTS COAL., 
Oct. 21, 2009, http://www.tnimmigrant.org/home/2009/10/21/prayer-vigil-voices-community-
opposition-to-287g-program.html. 
 135. Under the MOAs with DHS, only local law enforcement officers who receive special 
training in immigration enforcement may be cross-deputized to perform limited immigration 
enforcement under § 287(g).  However, in some jurisdictions, there is evidence that officers who 
have not been formally trained and deputized are carrying out immigration enforcement functions 
in reliance on their agency’s MOA under § 287(g).  See SHAHANI & GREENE, supra note 126, at 
15–16. 
 136. There is evidence that immigrants, including lawful immigrants and crime victims, are 
more reluctant to cooperate with local law enforcement agencies with § 287(g) agreements for 
fear of negative repercussions on their immigration status or the immigration status of their 
family.  See id. at 61. 
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Despite the widespread criticism of the § 287(g) program, it does not 
appear that Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano intends to heed 
the call of civil rights activists to put an end to the program.137  Although ICE 
has taken small steps toward possibly reforming federal oversight of 
jurisdictions participating in § 287(g)—such as the recent revocation of Sheriff 
Joe Arpaio’s task-force authority under his MOA with ICE in October 
2009138—the fact remains that more than half of the 67139 jurisdictions 
throughout the country are currently enforcing immigration law under 287(g) 
are participating in the task-force model, with no end in sight.140 
2. The Jail Model 
Less controversial than the task-force model is the jail model provision of 
the 287(g) program.141  While the jail model has not received as much criticism 
as the task-force model—due in large part to the absence of the inflammatory 
racial profiling allegations that have plagued the task-force model142—the jail 
model nonetheless deserves attention. I argue that, although the jail model may 
at first blush seem more innocuous than the task-force model, the jail model is 
in reality a more effective form of “devolution”143 of the federal immigration 
power to state and local law enforcement authorities than the task-force model. 
While the jail model relies on actual ICE agents to determine the immigration 
 
 137. See, e.g., Janet Napolitano, Prepared Remarks by Secretary Napolitano on Immigration 
Reform at the Center for American Progress (Nov. 13, 2009), http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/ 
speeches/sp_1258123461050.shtm (discussing plans for immigration reform in the Obama 
administration, which includes an increased focus on enforcement, but no mention of reform of 
the 287(g) program). 
 138. See, e.g., Gary Grado, Feds Strip Arpaio of Immigration Authority, THE E. VALLEY 
TRIB. (Mesa, Ariz.), Oct. 7, 2009, at A4, available at 2009 WLNR 19767953. 
 139. This figure is current as of October 2009.  See News Release, U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement, ICE Announces Standardized 287(g) Agreements with 67 State and Local 
Law Enforcement Partners (Oct. 16, 2009) http://www.ice.gov/pi/nr/0910/091016washington 
dc.htm [hereinafter USICE News Release]. 
 140. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DELEGATION OF IMMIGRATION 
AUTHORITY SECTION 287(G) IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT (Aug. 18, 2008), 
http://www.ice.gov/partners/287g/Section287_g.htm (featuring a list of participating 287(g) 
jurisdictions, including type of agreement) [hereinafter USICE Immigration Authority].  
Although DHS stopped entering into § 287(g) MOAs with new jurisdictions in 2008, agreements 
with existing jurisdictions that were set to expire have been renewed, and DHS has issued new 
guidelines expanding the program under the Obama Administration.  See Michelle Waslin, Policy 
or Politics? DHS Changes and Expands 287(g) Program, DICK & SHARON’S L.A. PROGRESSIVE, 
July 19, 2009, http://www.laprogressive.com/2009/07/16/policy-or-politics-dhs-changes-and-
expands-287g-program. 
 141. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. 1357 (2006). 
 142. See SHAHANI & GREENE, supra note 126, at 36. 
 143. See Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, 
Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 493 (2001). 
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status of persons who have already been detained pursuant to violations of 
state or local law—rather than relying on cross-deputized police officers 
making such determinations in the field—the danger of the jail model lies in its 
broad reach and wide scope.144 
What makes the jail model such an effective form of immigration 
devolution is its ability to check the immigration status of virtually every 
person who is arrested and booked into a jail facility in a jurisdiction that has 
an MOA with ICE under § 287(g).145  While state and local governments are 
encouraged—and perhaps required146—to cooperate with federal immigration 
authorities to determine the immigration status of alleged criminals in their 
custody who may be subject to removal, it is quite another thing to station ICE 
agents in local jails who check the immigration status of all persons who are 
determined to be foreign-born during the booking procedure.147 
The jail model continues to be in widespread use across the country by 
jurisdictions who are participating in the § 287(g) program, either alone or in 
connection with the task-force model.148  In fact, screening individuals to 
determine their immigration status at the time of booking into local jails is 
becoming more common as ICE has also rolled out the Criminal Alien 
Program (CAP)149 in addition to the § 287(g) jail model.  These programs, 
which have shifted detection and identification of undocumented persons from 
federal agencies to local law enforcement, represent how immigration 
federalism is currently devolving on a practical, every day level—not merely a 
theoretical level—and need to be halted if there is to be meaningful 
comprehensive immigration reform under Obama. 
 
 144. For a discussion of two large jurisdictions that have jail model MOAs with ICE under § 
287(g) and their impact on the local communities—Orange County, California and Los Angeles 
County, California—see ELIZABETH VENABLE, COAL. FOR HUMANE IMMIGRANT RIGHTS OF L. 
A., LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND IMMIGRATION: THE 287(G) PROGRAM IN SOUTHERN 
CALIFORNIA (Nov. 2008), http://chirla.org/files/287g%20Factsheet%2011-24-08.pdf. 
 145. See USICE News Release, supra note 139 (describing the Jail Model and the role of Jail 
Enforcement Officers). 
 146. See 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2006) (federal statute providing for communication between 
government agencies and federal immigration authorities). 
 147. See USICE News Release, supra note 139 (“Jail Enforcement Officers . . . identify aliens 
already incarcerated within their detention facilities who are eligible for removal”). 
 148. See USICE Immigration Authority, supra note 140 (list of 287(g) jurisdictions and type 
of agreements). 
 149. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAM 
(Nov. 19, 2008), http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/criminal_alien_program.htm. 
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3. Maricopa County, Arizona—A Case Study in the Abuse of the 287(g) 
Program 
Proponents of the § 287(g) program argue that the problems that have 
arisen are not due to lack of proper oversight by DHS and ICE, but rather 
improper enforcement of the program by overzealous local law enforcement 
agencies.150  Supporters of § 287(g) correctly point out that, under their MOAs, 
participating jurisdictions should not inquire about the immigration status of 
individuals unless they are detained for something that is “more than a routine 
traffic stop.”151  However, the failure of the federal agencies to adequately 
communicate with participating jurisdictions regarding the scope of their 
authority under § 287(g)—and their inability or unwillingness to hold 
jurisdictions who overstep their bounds accountable—has led to a lack of 
uniformity and serious problems with fair and just enforcement of the program 
nationwide. 
Although many jurisdictions that have entered into 287(g) agreements with 
DHS have come under scrutiny for uneven enforcement and allegations of 
racial profiling,152 none have been subject to more scrutiny, criticism, and 
charges of civil rights violations than the Sheriff’s Office in Maricopa County, 
Arizona.153  Under the leadership of Sheriff Joe Arpaio—a public official who 
won his fourth-straight election in November 2008 with 55% of the votes154—
the MSCO’s 287(g) agreement has literally become the poster-child for the 
abuses inherent in the 287(g) program.155  From his repeated insistence that he 
does not need the 287(g) agreement to enforce civil immigration laws,156 to his 
 
 150. See ANITA KHASHU, POLICE FOUND., THE ROLE OF LOCAL POLICE: STRIKING A 
BALANCE BETWEEN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 26–27 (Apr. 2009), 
http://www.policefoundation.org/pdf/strikingabalance/Role%20of%20Local%20Police.pdf. 
 151. See, e.g., Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 125. 
 152. See SHAHANI & GREENE, supra note 126, at 36. 
 153. There have been a plethora of media and other reports documenting the outrageous and 
often overtly racist actions of the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office.  See, e.g., William Finnegan, 
Sheriff Joe, THE NEW YORKER, JULY 20, 2009, at 42. 
 154. See J.J. Hensley, Poll: 61% of Voters in Arizona Approve of Arpaio’s Job Approach, 
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 28, 2009, http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2009/10/28/20091028 
bigbrother1028side.html. 
 155. For example, recent congressional hearings examining whether the 287(g) program 
encourages racial profiling by local law-enforcement officials focused heavily on the actions of 
Sheriff Arpaio and his deputies.  See, e.g., The Justice Department: Hearing Before the H. 
Judiciary Comm., 111th Cong. 47 (May 13, 2010) (LEXIS, Federal News Service) (Attorney 
General Eric Holder commenting that the Department of Justice is currently investigating claims 
against Sheriff Arpaio of civil-rights violations). 
 156. Sheriff Arpaio has repeatedly asserted that he may stop, question, and detain persons on 
the basis of determining their immigration status alone as part of his authority to enforce the state 
human smuggling law.  See infra Part II.B.3. 
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“Illegal Immigration Interdiction Unit” (also known as the “Triple I Unit),”157 
to the “crime-suppression sweeps” that he has used to terrorize the Latino 
residents of Maricopa County over the last several years—often with the 
assistance of his “posse” of vigilantes, many of whom have white supremacist 
ties158—Sheriff Arpaio’s abuse of MCSO’s 287(g) agreement with DHS is a 
cautionary tale of the dangers of delegating local law enforcement and 
permitting them to act as ICE officials without adequate training or oversight. 
Arguably the most egregious conduct that Sheriff Arpaio and his deputies 
have engaged in pursuant their § 287(g) authority are the “crime suppression 
sweeps” that have become a routine matter in Latino neighborhoods in 
Maricopa County over the last several years.159 These checkpoints and 
blockades, which have been set up all over the county with the express purpose 
of detaining “illegals,”160 have resulted in persons of Latino heritage being 
stopped, detained, and arrested—usually for civil immigration status 
violations—on the pretext of offenses such as “improper use of a horn.”161  
Persons have been stopped and detained for doing nothing more than walking 
on the sidewalk,162 or for having the bad luck to be dropping a parent off at 
 
 157. See Editorial, Arpaio’s Illegal Immigration Policy Isn’t Worth Cost, 
WESTVALLEYEDITORIALS BLOG, Dec. 12, 2007, http://www.azcentral.com/members/Blog/West 
ValleyEditorials/12542 (discussing the role of the Illegal Immigration Interdiction Unit in 
Maricopa County’s crime suppression sweeps). 
 158. See Andrea Nill, Sheriff Joe Arpaio to Recruit and Arm Citizens, Neo-Nazis “Have His 
Back”, IMMIGRATION IMPACT, May 8, 2009, http://immigrationimpact.com/2009/05/08/joe-
arpaio-neo-nazi-posse. 
 159. In the last several years, Sheriff Arpaio has been conducting immigration raids, which 
his office refers to as “crime suppression sweeps,” throughout Maricopa County.  See Dennis 
Wagner, Impact of Arpaio’s Sweeps Is Unclear, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, October 4, 2008, at A1, 
available at http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2008/10/04/20081004arpaio-sweeps10 
04.html. 
 160. See, e.g., News Release, Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, Weekend Crime Suppression 
Operation Concludes: Deputies Turn Over 19 Suspected Illegal Immigrants to Federal Authorities 
Without Incident (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.mcso.org/include/pr_pdf/10-19-2009%20News%20 
Release.pdf. 
 161. A U.S. citizen who was detained in the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office sweep in May 
2008 in Guadalupe, Arizona—a town that is one square mile and whose population is 100% 
ethnic minority (Yacqui Indian and Latino)—was stopped and questioned about his immigration 
status on this basis.  See Stephen Lemons, Guadalupe Made it Clear that Joe Arpaio’s Attacking 
Anyone with Brown Skin, PHOENIX NEW TIMES, May 29, 2008, http://www.phoenixnewtimes. 
com/2008-05-29/news/guadalupe-made-it-clear-that-joe-arpaio-s-attacking-anyone-with-brown-
skin. 
 162. Julio Mora, a U.S. citizen, and his father, a legal permanent resident, were detained for 
hours pursuant to one of Sheriff Arpaio’s sweeps of a landscaping business, Handyman 
Maintenance, Inc., in February 2009.  The Moras have since filed a lawsuit alleging violations of 
their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that they were detained simply because they 
were Latino.  See Stephen Lemons, Joe Arpaio vs. ACLU: New Lawsuit Tomorrow over Worksite 
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work on the day of one of Sheriff Arpaio’s sweeps.163  These raids have 
created a palpable climate of fear in Maricopa County that can be directly 
traced to the federal government’s delegation of immigration enforcement 
responsibilities to a local law enforcement agency that has neither the training, 
nor the oversight, to carry out these functions properly. 
A thorough treatment of the civil and human rights abuses that the 
Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office has allegedly engaged in is beyond the scope 
of this Article.164  However, when examining the ways in which Sheriff Arpaio 
has seen fit to implement his authority under § 287(g) to question, detain, and 
arrest persons solely for suspected civil immigration status violations, it is 
important to note the way in which the Sheriff has relied upon Arizona state 
law in accomplishing his goal of ridding Maricopa County of undocumented 
persons.  In particular, Sheriff Arpaio has used the statewide anti-immigrant 
laws passed in recent years165 to create an environment where—in collusion 
with the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office—persons who are alleged to be 
undocumented immigrants are pretextually stopped, arrested, charged, and 
detained based on little more than race, color, ethnicity, or national origin.166  
As a result, Sheriff Arpaio has been subject to repeated allegations of racial 
 
Raid, PHOENIX NEW TIMES, Aug. 18, 2009, http://blogs.phoenixnewtimes.com/bastard/2009/08/ 
sheriff_joe_arpaio_vs_aclu_new.php. 
 163. See Testimony of Julio Cesar Mora, Public Safety and Civil Rights Implications of State 
and Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, 
Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security and Int’l Law and the Subcomm. on the Const., Civil 
Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 11 (2009) U.S. House 
of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Apr. 2, 2009, at 11, http://judiciary.house.gov/ 
hearings/printers/111th/111-19_48439.pdf. 
 164. The author is currently in the process of writing an Article dedicated solely to the battle 
over immigration in the State of Arizona.  The author hopes to publish the Article, Historic Police 
Powers or State-Sanctioned Vigilantism?  How Arizona Became Ground Zero for the 
Immigrants’ Rights Movement and the Continuing Struggle for Latino Civil Rights in America, 
sometime in 2010. 
 165. For a discussion of anti-immigrant laws in the State of Arizona, see supra Part I. 
 166. Details of the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office’s conduct that raise serious concerns 
about racial profiling of Latinos can be found in the Pulitzer Prize winning five-part series 
Reasonable Doubt. Ryan Gabrielson & Paul Giblin, Reasonable Doubt: Tribune Investigates 
Sheriff’s Immigration Campaign: At What Cost?, E. VALLEY TRIB. (Mesa, Ariz.), July 9, 2008, at 
A12.  Additionally, a federal lawsuit against Maricopa County and the Maricopa County Sheriff’s 
Office is currently pending in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, alleging 
racial profiling on behalf of five individuals by the Sheriff’s Office based on their Latino 
ethnicity.  See Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio, 598 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1029 (D. Ariz. 2009).  The 
plaintiffs’ motion for class certification was denied on August 24, 2009, with the court holding 
that it a decision on the motion would be “premature.”  See Ortega-Melendres v. Maricopa 
County, No.CV-07-2513-PHX-GMS, 2009 WL 2707241, at *7 (D. Ariz. Aug. 24, 2009). 
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profiling167 and has created a reign of terror for all Latinos in Maricopa 
County—citizen and immigrant alike.168 
B. ICE Raids in the Bush Administration 
Although the large-scale raids undertaken by ICE in the waning years of 
the Bush Administration were not a devolution of immigration federalism in 
the same way the 287(g) program is, I argue that these types of splashy—and 
largely ineffective—enforcement-only tactics by ICE are the result of the 
federal government’s recent laziness in exercising its plenary power over 
immigration.  That is, while Congress and the Executive could make much 
more meaningful headway on immigration issues by pursuing comprehensive 
immigration reform at the federal level and penalizing employers who are in 
violation of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA),169 it has been 
easier for them to delegate enforcement of immigration violations to local 
authorities and conduct devastating raids on hard-working immigrants that do 
nothing to solve our immigration problems, but give the appearance of being 
tough on individuals who have committed the “crime” of working without 
authorization. 
While worksite raids were common in the Bush Administration, the 
incident that has come to symbolize in the minds of many the tragedy as well 
as the failure of enforcement-only immigration federalism is the Postville Raid 
of 2008.170  The worksite raid at Agriprocessors, Inc., in Postville, Iowa was a 
devastating and unprecedented event in immigration enforcement in United 
States immigration policy, both for the employer and the employees who were 
caught up in the federal government’s dragnet.  What sets the Postville raid 
apart from other ICE raids, both before and since, is the novel theory used by 
the United States Attorney’s Office of the Northern District of Iowa against the 
employees who were detained in the raid—the use of their prosecutorial 
 
 167. See Gabrielson & Giblin, supra note 166. 
 168. Sheriff Arpaio’s deputies are alleged to routinely stop and detain U.S. citizens of Latino 
heritage based on nothing more than their ethnicity.  For example, four of the five named 
plaintiffs in Ortega-Melendres are U.S. citizens who alleged that they were racially profiled by 
the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office.  See Ortega-Melendres, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 1030. 
 169. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.). 
 170. Federal immigration authorities raided a plant operated by Agriprocessors, Inc., on May 
12, 2008, in Postville, Iowa, charging hundreds of undocumented workers with aggravated 
identity theft in order to procure guilty pleas from the workers.  For a summary of the events at 
Postville and criticism of the actions taken by the government, see generally Julia Preston, An 
Interpreter Speaking Up for Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2008, at A1; abUSed—The 
Postville Raid (Internet video), Oct. 2008, http://www.abusedthepostvilleraid.com. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
444 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIX:415 
discretion to charge hundreds of undocumented persons with identity theft 
under federal criminal law.171 
Most of the persons charged pursuant to the Postville raids served five 
months in federal prison and were then deported.172  However, the egregious 
due process violations that were noted by attorneys and advocates for the 
immigrants workers caught up in the Postville raid,173 as well as the United 
States Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Flores-Figueroa v. United 
States174 clarifying under what circumstances prosecutors may charge certain 
individuals with “aggravated identity theft,”175 were a watershed moment 
regarding how ICE and local prosecutors carry out worksite raids.176  While 
Secretary Napolitano has not indicated that worksite raids will cease 
completely—and indeed, raids have continued under the Obama 
Administration177—the lessons learned from the Postville raid make it unlikely 
that such aggressive enforcement of IRCA violations will continue now that 
the Bush Administration has come to an end. 
 
 171. See, e.g., Jens Manuel Krogstad, Harkin’s Nominee for U.S. Attorney Under Fire for 
Role in Postville Raid, THE COURIER (Waterloo, Iowa), Apr. 5, 2009, at A1, available at 
http://www.wcfcourier.com/news/politics/article_546da03d-18c5-51b0-a3ef-7ba0c644eb22.html. 
 172. See Nigel Duara, William Petroski & Grant Shulte, Claims of ID Fraud Lead to Largest 
Raid in State History, DES MOINES REG., May 12, 2008, available at http://www.desmoines 
register.com/article/20080512/NEWS/80512012/Claims-of-ID-fraud-lead-to-largest-raid-in-state-
history. 
 173. See, e.g., Erik Camayd-Freixas, Interpreting the Largest ICE Raid in History: A 
Personal Account, June 13, 2008, at 3–4, http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/2008/07/14/ 
opinion/14ed-camayd.pdf.  Dr. Camayd-Friexas, a Professor of Interpreting at Florida 
International University, served as an interpreter for many of the detained Postville workers and 
has been extremely critical of the tactics taken by the government in the Postville raid. 
 174. Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886 (2009). 
 175. Flores-Figueroa involved a challenge to a defendant’s conviction for aggravated identify 
theft, and the accompanying mandatory minimum sentence of two years, as applied to an 
individual whose false social security number did not actually belong to another person.  The U.S. 
Attorney in the Northern District of Iowa charged all the persons detained in the Postville raid 
with aggravated identity theft in order to procure guilty pleas from the defendants, regardless of 
the underlying facts of how they obtained their false documentation and their individual levels of 
knowledge.  In a 9-0 decision, the Court held that in order for the government to obtain a 
conviction for aggravated identity theft, the prosecution had to prove that the defendants 
“knowingly” used the identity information of an actual individual.  See id. at 1894. 
 176. The former executive of Agriprocessors, Inc., Sholom Rubashkin, was subsequently 
prosecuted criminally in connection with his management of the Postville meat-packing plant.  
On November 12, 2009, he was found guilty of 86 counts of bank fraud, and potentially faces life 
in prison.  Mr. Rubaskin also faces another trial in South Dakota in December 2009 for alleged 
immigration violations.  See Nathaniel Popper, Former Agriprocessors CEO Rubashkin Sent to 
Prison, THE JEWISH DAILY FORWARD, Nov. 18, 2009, http://www.forward.com/articles/119188/. 
 177. See, e.g., Lornet Turnbull, Immigration Officials Raid Bellingham Plant, THE SEATTLE 
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2009, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2008781541_webraid 
24m.html. 
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C. The Increase of Hate Crimes Against Immigrants and Latinos in the 2000s 
In the wake of the stepped-up enforcement against undocumented 
immigrants by the Bush Administration, and the increasing reliance on state 
and local law enforcement agencies to enforce federal immigration law, the 
debate surrounding immigration took a tragic—though I argue, not 
unforeseeable—turn as the rhetoric often used by immigration restrictionists 
became the calling card of hate against immigrants, Latinos, and other groups 
that are easily targeted as potentially “foreign.”178  Although hate crimes 
against persons of color did, unfortunately, occur prior to the rise of 
inflammatory immigration rhetoric, it is nearly impossible to deny that the 
sharp spike in hate crimes against Latinos—a 40% increase between 2003 and 
2007179—is not somehow connected to the often racist and xenophobic 
undertones that arise in the immigration debate.180 
A recent hate crime that had overtly racist overtones against a Latino 
immigrant was the murder of Luis Ramirez in 2008 in Shenandoah, 
Pennsylvania,181 which is not too far from the infamous Hazleton, 
Pennsylvania.182  Ramirez, an undocumented Mexican national who had lived 
in Shenandoah for several years with his fiancé and their children, was 
murdered by three White high-school students following a confrontation late 
one night in July 2008.183  Although the overtly racist elements of the murder 
were undisputed—the students admitted to uttering racial slurs as they hit, 
kicked, punched, and stomped Ramirez to death184—the students were not 
 
 178. See Hatewatch, Anti-Latino Hate Crimes Rise for Fourth Year in a Row, S. POVERTY L. 
CENTER, Oct. 29, 2008, http://www.splcenter.org/blog/2008/10/29/anti-latino-hate-crimes-rise-
for-fourth-year. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Overtly racist commentary directed toward Latinos—particularly Mexicans—can 
generally be found in the comments section of any major online newspaper article discussing 
immigration or immigration reform.  See, e.g., Linda Valdez, Arizona: Give Amnesty to Migrants, 
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2007, http://www.azcentral.com/members/Blog/Valdez/6002 (see 
comments section) (last visited Feb. 9, 2010).  However, for a more thorough analysis of the link 
between anti-immigrant sentiment and hate crimes, see Anti-Defamation League, Immigration 
Reports and Resources, http://www.adl.org/civil_rights/immigration.asp (last visited Feb. 9, 
2010). 
 181. See, e.g., Sean D. Hamill, Mexican’s Death Bares a Town’s Ethnic Tension, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 5, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/05/us/05attack.html. 
 182. For a discussion on Hazleton, see supra Part I. 
 183. See Hamill, supra note 181. 
 184. See, e.g., Emanuella Grinberg, Some Satisfied, Others Outraged with Verdict for 
Immigrant’s Death, CNN, May 3, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/05/02/pa.immigrant. 
beating/index.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2010). 
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charged with a hate crime185 and were ultimately acquitted of murder by an all-
White jury.186 
Unfortunately, Luis Ramirez is not the only Latino immigrant who lost his 
life as a result of xenophobic furor.187  Although the United States Department 
of Justice is investigating the murder of Luis Ramirez and other Latinos as hate 
crimes,188 there is still a great deal of fear in the immigrant and Latino 
community not only of becoming a target of a racially-motivated crime, but 
also of potentially being subject to negative immigration consequences for 
reporting criminal activity.189 
III.  THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE VS. STATE POLICE POWER: WHAT 
CONGRESS AND THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION MUST DO TO ACCOMPLISH 
MEANINGFUL IMMIGRATION REFORM 
A. Congress’s Plenary Power to Regulate Immigration 
In the wake of what Professor Michael Wishnie has called the “devolution” 
of the federal immigration power,190 and the subsequent resurgence of the state 
and local immigration regulations discussed in Part I, there has been an 
increasingly lively conversation among immigration law scholars regarding the 
constitutionality of immigration federalism and how far the plenary power 
doctrine extends.191  As has been noted, it has long been accepted that 
 
 185. One of the youths, Colin Walsh, pleaded guilty to violating Mr. Ramirez’s civil rights in 
federal court and testified against the other alleged killers in the state prosecution.  See Michael 
Rubinkam, Luis Ramirez Killers Found Not Guilty After Beating Mexican Immigrant to Death, 
HUFFINGTON POST, May 2, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/05/04/luis-ramirez-
killers-foun_n_195535.html. 
 186. See Grinberg, supra note 184. 
 187. Other Latinos whose deaths are being investigated as hate crimes include Marcelo 
Lucero, 37, an Ecuadoran immigrant who was murdered by teenagers looking for “beaners” in 
Patchogue, New York on Nov. 8, 2008; Wilter Sanchez, beaten and then run over in New Jersey 
on January 21, 2009; and José Sucuzhañay, murdered on December 9, 2008, by individuals 
yelling racist and anti-gay slurs in New York.  See Ramona E. Romero & Cristóbal Josh Alex, 
Hispanic Groups Angered by Immigrant Hate Crimes, LATINO J., Jan. 26, 2009, http://thelatino 
journal.blogspot.com/2009/01/hispanic-groups-angered-by-immigrant.html. 
 188. See Frank Eltman, After Immigrant Killed in NY, Others Tell of Abuse, ABC NEWS, Nov. 
7, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=9021630. 
 189. Id. (reporting that “many victims had always been reluctant to contact police, fearing 
they would be asked about their immigration status”). 
 190. See Wishnie, supra note 143, at 512. 
 191. See, e.g., Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 
61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 807 (2008) (reexamining the constitutionality of federal exclusivity to 
regulate immigration); Rodríguez, supra note 6, at 575–76 (arguing that localities may 
constitutionally play a role in immigration law and policy and the potential benefits that can flow 
from such regulation); Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration 
Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1088–95 (arguing that the federal government has the exclusive 
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immigration law is primarily, if not exclusively, within the province of the 
federal government.192  However, there is also a long history of state regulation 
of immigration that arises from their inherent police powers.193  As a result, the 
lines between where federal dominance of immigration regulation ends, and 
the states’ authority to regulate immigration pursuant to their legitimate 
interests begins, has become increasingly blurry as time goes on. 
1. The Doctrine of Immigration Federalism 
The word “immigration” does not appear anywhere in the United States 
Constitution.  The only power expressly delegated to Congress in the 
Constitution concerning immigration is the authority to “establish a[n] uniform 
Rule of Naturalization.”194  However, it is well-settled that the federal 
government has the power to regulate the admission of aliens to this country, 
as well as the power to exclude and remove them if they see fit.195  This is 
because, despite the lack of express authority in the Constitution giving the 
political branches the power to regulate immigration, the federal courts have 
consistently held that Congress has “plenary power” to regulate 
immigration.196 
Congress’s plenary power to regulate immigration is an expansive doctrine 
that was first announced by the United States Supreme Court in The Chinese 
Exclusion Case.197  In that case, the Court rejected the claim by a Chinese 
laborer, Chae Chan Ping, that his exclusion from the United States on the basis 
of his race violated the Constitution.198  In holding that Congress has the power 
to exclude aliens on any basis it sees fit—including race—the Court stated: 
Whatever license . . . Chinese laborers may have obtained, previous to the 
act of October 1, 1888, to return to the United States after their departure, is 
held at the will of the government, revocable at any time, at its pleasure.  
Whether a proper consideration by our government of its previous laws . . . 
 
authority to regulate immigration); Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? 
Local Sovereignty and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 1400–01 (2006) 
(same). 
 192. See Chae Chan Ping & Fong Yue Ting, The Origins of Plenary Power, in IMMIGRATION 
LAW STORIES 7 (David A. Martin and Peter H. Schuck ed., 2005). 
 193. See Gerald L. Neuman, A Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 
COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1866–67 (1993). 
 194. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 195. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Cristina Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 
YALE L.J. 458 (2010). 
 196. See Ping & Ting, supra note 192. 
 197. See generally Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
 198. Id. at 611. 
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ought to have qualified its inhibition . . . are not questions for judicial 
determination.199 
Thus, The Chinese Exclusion Case is notable for announcing the plenary 
power doctrine, holding that regulation of immigration is exclusively within 
the province of the political branches of the federal government, and that the 
decisions made by Congress and the Executive regarding whom to admit and 
whom to exclude.200 
Since The Chinese Exclusion Case, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
reaffirmed the federal government’s sovereignty over immigration.201  The 
Supreme Court has also weighed in rather forcefully regarding the proper role 
of the states in immigration regulation, stating in United States v. Pink202 that 
“[p]ower over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the 
national government exclusively.”203  In Harisades v. Shaughnessy,204 the 
Supreme Court broadly categorized Congress’s plenary power to regulate 
immigration as concerning “any policy toward aliens.”205  However, despite 
the unquestionable Supremacy of federal law in immigration matters, the fact 
remains that the states’ historic police powers to regulate in other areas 
traditionally reserved to them often complicates the question of when a 
permissible regulation of aliens by a state becomes an impermissible regulation 
of immigration law.206  This has led, perhaps inevitably, to the conflict between 
state and federal regulation of immigration that we face today. 
B. The States’ Historic Police Powers Concerning Immigration 
1. Early Interpretations of the States’ Immigration Powers 
Although the Constitution expressly grants Congress the regulate 
naturalization—and therefore, impliedly, immigration—Congress did not see 
fit to establish uniform regulations governing immigration until the late 
nineteenth century.207  In fact, it appears that the framers of the Constitution 
left laws regulating the exclusion of aliens to the several states, while the 
federal government itself maintained what was more or less an “open borders” 
 
 199. Id. at 609. 
 200. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary 
Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255. 
 201. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
 202. 315 U.S. 203 (1942). 
 203. Id. at 233. 
 204. 342 U.S. 580 (1952). 
 205. Id. at 588. 
 206. As the U.S. Supreme Court has stated, not every regulation of aliens is a regulation of 
immigration.  See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976). 
 207. See Neuman, supra note 193, at 1866–67. 
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immigration policy.208  In fact, prior to Congress’s passage of laws regulating 
immigration at the federal level in 1875,209 it was commonplace for the States 
to have their own laws and policies regulating who could remain within their 
territories.210 
However, despite the fact that the States had an early role in regulating 
immigration, once the federal government stepped in and asserted its authority 
over immigration, the States were generally reluctant to challenge that scheme. 
While the view that the States retain some inherent authority to regulate 
immigration would arise occasionally over the next century, 211 the prevailing 
doctrine of Congress’s plenary power to regulate immigration largely 
prevented States from attempting to pass their own immigration laws 
independent of the federal government.212  It was not until the late twentieth 
century that, once again, the States began to assert that their historic police 
powers not only permit, but require the federal government to defer to the 
States on certain matters pertaining to aliens within their borders, such as 
education and employment.213 
2. Modern Interpretations of the States’ Authority to Regulate 
Immigration 
Because of what Professor Neuman calls the “lost century” of American 
immigration law,214 in which the federal government had virtually no role 
concerning the regulation of immigration, the debate regarding the proper role 
of states in modern immigration law and policy rages on to this day.  While the 
INA has been amended countless times since its creation in 1952,215 Congress 
has, in general, said precious little about where the federal power to regulate 
immigration ends and the states’ historic police power to govern their affairs 
by regulating the activities of immigrants within their jurisdiction begins. 
 
 208. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, 
and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power Over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 
81 (2002). 
 209. See Neuman, supra note 193, at 1834. 
 210. See Rodríguez, supra note 6, at 611−14. 
 211. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). 
 212. Id. 
 213. See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority 
of Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179 (2005) (arguing that the 
federal government only has enumerated powers, and because immigration regulation is not 
expressly enumerated in the Constitution as a federal power, it is left to the states to regulate the 
activities of immigrants within their borders). 
 214. See Neuman, supra note 193, at 1834. 
 215. The most recent—and sweeping—revision of the INA occurred in 1996.  See Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 
Stat. 3009-546 (1996). 
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Perhaps the area in which the line between state and federal regulation of 
immigration is the most blurred concerns the employment of undocumented 
immigrants.  In 1976, the United States Supreme Court held in De Canas v. 
Bica that California’s state law regulating the employment of unauthorized 
aliens was not preempted under federal law.216  The decision in De Canas, 
which held that it was within the states’ historic police power to regulate the 
employment of undocumented immigrants, was controlling precedent for the 
next decade.217  Then, in 1986, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act (IRCA),218 which made the employment of unauthorized workers 
“central to ‘[t]he policy of immigration law.’”219  Therefore, in light of 
Congress’s action, the conventional wisdom since the implementation of IRCA 
had been that since Congress had enacted a comprehensive federal scheme 
regulating the employment of aliens, the states no longer had the authority to 
enact laws like the one upheld in De Canas because they would now be 
preempted under federal law except in limited circumstances.220 
However, in September 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit held that Arizona’s state employer sanctions law was not 
preempted under the Supremacy Clause because “the power to regulate the 
employment of unauthorized aliens remains within the states’ historic police 
powers.”221  Although the plaintiffs have petitioned the United States Supreme 
Court for a writ of certiorari,222 this decision by the Ninth Circuit has cast 
serious doubt on the proper role of the States in the enforcement of 
immigration law post-IRCA, particularly in the area of regulating employment 
of undocumented immigrants. 
Another area in which the United States Supreme Court has weighed in on 
the battle between state and federal regulation of undocumented aliens is 
education.  Following its decision in De Canas, in 1982 the United States 
Supreme Court struck down a Texas statute that prohibited undocumented 
immigrant children from receiving free primary and secondary education at the 
 
 216. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355−56 (1976). 
 217. Id. at 357. 
 218. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986). 
 219. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002) (quoting INS v. 
Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 194 n.8 (1991)). 
 220. IRCA contains several “savings clauses” that permit the states to regulate immigration in 
a limited fashion.  The most prominent saving clause, which carves out an exception for states 
that permits them to regulate employment through “licensing or similar laws,” is contained in § 
1324(a)(h)(2), and has been the catalyst for a great deal of litigation in the last several years.  See 
supra Part I.B. 
 221. Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 865 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 222. See supra note 122 (discussing the status of the petition in United States Chamber of 
Commerce v. Candelaria). 
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state’s expense in Plyler v. Doe.223  In its holding, the Plyler Court stated that 
“the States do have some authority to act with respect to illegal aliens, at least 
where such action mirrors federal objectives and furthers a legitimate state 
goal.”224  However, the majority held that States did not have the authority to 
deny undocumented immigrant children the right to an education on equal 
protection grounds, despite the fact that they also explicitly held found that 
Texas had a legitimate state interest in attempting to mitigate the financial 
burden imposed on the State by educating such children.225 
The holding in Plyler has not yet been revisited by the Supreme Court, and 
it continues to stand for the narrow proposition that undocumented children 
may not be denied an education at public expense—despite the Court’s express 
holding that education is not a fundamental right.226  Therefore, although some 
States occasionally raise the idea of attempting to pass legislation prohibiting 
undocumented children from receiving a free public education,227 unless and 
until the Supreme Court overturns its decision in Plyler, it can safely be said 
that the States may not restrict education to undocumented children as part of 
their historic police powers.228 
C. The Supremacy Clause and Preemption of State Regulation of 
Immigration in the Obama Administration 
1. The Role of the Executive in Immigration Regulation as a Matter of 
Law, Not Policy 
  Although this article is critical of the enforcement-heavy immigration 
policies of the Bush Administration,229 it is a fact that the President has the 
constitutional authority to enforce federal immigration laws in any manner he 
 
 223. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 224. Id. at 230. 
 225. Id. at 223, 228.  The holding in Plyler, which was the result of a 5-4 split of the Court, 
has been criticized as not grounded in law but as based on the Court’s attempt to avoid a result 
that would have been a policy disaster. 
 226. Id. at 221, 227. 
 227. While not advocating for a complete ban against enrolling undocumented students in 
public school, in April 2009, Pima County, Arizona Sheriff Clarence Dupnik opined that school 
districts should check the citizenship of students before allowing them to enroll.  See Pima 
County Sheriff Calls for School Immigration Checks, ARIZ. REPUBLIC., Apr. 29, 2009, 
http://www.azcentral.com/community/pinal/articles/2009/04/29/20090429SchoolChecks29-
ON.html. 
 228. There are, of course, persons who believe the decision in Plyer must be overturned, and 
are hoping to bring a case that would ultimately reverse Plyler up to the Supreme Court.  See, 
e.g., David W. Stewart, Immigration and School Overcrowding, THE FED’N FOR AM. IMMIGR. 
REFORM, Oct. 2, 2009, http://www.fairus.org/site/PageServer?pagename=iic_immigrationissue 
centers51f8 (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
 229. See supra Part II. 
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sees fit, so long as in doing so he does not frustrate the will of Congress.230  
Therefore, while I disagree with the immigration enforcement tactics taken by 
the Bush Administration as a matter of policy, I do not believe it would have 
been better to allow state and local governments to take immigration 
enforcement matters into their own hands simply because they disagree with 
the policy of the federal government.  As stated repeatedly in this Article, I 
believe that allowing the States to regulate immigration apart from or in 
addition to the policies set by the federal government—either by being more 
permissive or more restrictive—is not a constitutionally sound policy, and that 
the Obama Administration should work with Congress to put an end to the 
growing split of authority on this issue percolating in the federal courts by 
amending the INA in the very near future. 
In this respect, I want to emphasize the difference between affirmative 
rejection of federal immigration law and policy by state and local 
governments, as opposed to policy decisions made by local law enforcement 
that are designed to reinforce federal immigration law.  For example, there has 
been much debate over so-called “sanctuary cities,” which are local 
jurisdictions that have stated that they will not require or permit local law 
enforcement officials to enforce federal immigration laws.231  Critics have 
accused sanctuary cities of “flouting” federal immigration law, and contend 
that they are merely the flip-side of the state and local anti-immigrant laws 
described in Part I.232  In reality, however, the policies of these cities merely 
reaffirm the proper lines between state and federal jurisdictions by refusing to 
require or permit local law enforcement officers to act as federal immigration 
agents without the training or jurisdiction to do so.233 
Because these “sanctuary city” laws do not add or subtract to federal 
immigration law—indeed, they do nothing more than restate what is required 
under federal law—it cannot accurately be said that such laws must also be 
preempted under the Supremacy Clause as impermissible regulations of 
immigration.  By contrast, the anti-immigrant laws passed by various states 
and municipalities have, by and large, been substantive attempts to alter the 
federal immigration laws set forth in the Immigration and Nationality Act 
 
 230. See, e.g., Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 195. 
 231. See, e.g., Kobach, supra note 213, at 206 (arguing that local governments are preempted 
by federal law from enacting sanctuary or federal non-cooperation ordinances); Pham, supra note 
191, at 1402–03 (arguing that the local governments should be permitted, as a matter of 
sovereignty, to refuse to cooperate with federal immigration authorities). 
 232. See, e.g., Kobach, supra note 213, at 227. 
 233. See, e.g., Los Angeles Police Dept. Special Order 40, http://keepstuff.homestead.com/ 
Spec40orig.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).  Special Order 40, which was implemented by 
former Chief Darryl Gates, has been the policy of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) 
since 1979.  Id.  Special Order 40 states that LAPD officers have the responsibility to enforce 
state and local law, not federal immigration law, and thus have no jurisdiction to arrest persons 
for civil immigration violations.  Id. 
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(INA).234  As such, my argument that now is the critical time for the political 
branches to reassert their dominance in the field of immigration regulation is 
based on my belief in the principle of immigration federalism, and not on the 
merits of the policies of either the Bush or Obama Administrations.235 
2. Congress and the Obama Administration Must Act Now to Reassert 
the Supremacy of Federal Immigration Law 
I argue that the first step that must be taken by the Obama Administration 
in order to reestablish the supremacy of the federal government in immigration 
matters is to enact an immediate moratorium on the 287(g) program, and to 
eventually abolish the program altogether.236 As discussed previously,237 
although § 287(g) expressly provides that the federal government may delegate 
some of its enforcement of immigration law to state and local law enforcement 
through Memorandums of Agreements (MOA),238—formerly called 
Memorandums of Understanding (MOU)239—I argue that § 287(g) needs to be 
repealed in its entirety—not merely amended—in order to achieve the clarity 
necessary on behalf of the federal government to wholly occupy the field of 
immigration law and halt all state and local attempts to regulate immigration. 
Beyond the repeal of § 287(g), I believe that meaningful comprehensive 
immigration reform will require a complete a substantial overhaul of the INA 
in its entirety, in a way that forcefully reasserts Congress’s plenary power to 
regulate immigration.  Historically, Congress has used to its plenary power to 
regulate immigration through the INA not by giving more rights to immigrants, 
but by restricting them.240  I argue that in light of the recent trend of some 
courts to interpret the proper role of the states in immigration enforcement 
broadly—that is, to focus on their historic police powers, rather than the 
supremacy of the federal government in immigration matters—it is essential 
that Congress amend the INA to expressly preempt state regulation of 
immigration by the state in all matters.  I suggest that rather than attempting to 
 
 234. See supra Part I. 
 235. Although I do, of course, hold opinions about the merits and morality of the policies of 
both administrations.  See infra Part II.  See supra Part IV. 
 236. See supra Part II.  Additionally, immigrants’ rights advocates and civil libertarians have 
been calling for a moratorium on the 287(g) program for some time now.  See, e.g., Raids on 
Workers: Destroying Our Rights, NAT’L COMM’N ON ICE MISCONDUCT AND FOURTH 
AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS, http://www.icemisconduct.org/docUploads/UFCW%20ICE%20rpt% 
20FINAL%20150B_061809_130632.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
 237. See supra Part II. 
 238. See supra Part II.A.3 (exemplifying the pre-2009 § 287(g) MOA is the DHS’s agreement 
with Maricopa County, Arizona). 
 239. See supra note 125. 
 240. See generally Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 195 (discussing Congress’s historical use of 
the plenary power doctrine to regulate immigration). 
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clean up poorly worded statutes, such as the infamously ambiguous “savings 
clause” in the express preemption provision of 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(h)(2),241 
Congress needs to simply write a new, catch-all provision of the INA that 
clearly and succinctly draws the line between state and federal regulation of 
immigration. 
It is possible, of course, that in drawing a bright line between state and 
federal authority to regulate immigration, that Congress may choose to expand 
the parameters of what is currently believed to be the legitimate authority of 
the states in this area.  However, even if Congress chooses ultimately to 
delegate its power in this manner, it will be preferable to having what we have 
now—which is to say, a hodgepodge of various state and local regulations of 
immigration, some of which have been held to conflict with federal 
immigration laws and others which have not. 
IV.  DARING TO DREAM: A RE-INVENTION OF IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. The Promise of a New Day: Plenary Power, International Law, and 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform in the Twenty-First Century 
President Obama’s receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize in October 2009242 
demonstrates, more than any of his other accomplishments to date, the 
potential for radical change under his leadership and the hope that his 
Presidency embodies not just within our nation, but worldwide. Although 
critics have charged that this prestigious honor was prematurely bestowed on 
the President243—that he has not yet done anything to merit such recognition 
less than a year into his Presidency—others see the Nobel Peace Prize as a vote 
of confidence in President Obama’s ability to be a global leader and innovator 
of change.  It is almost certain that one of the areas in which the world wants—
and needs—to see President Obama pursue peace is one of the most pressing 
issues of our time: international immigration and migration. 
While the plenary power to regulate immigration has traditionally been 
viewed by both Congress and the Executive as an insular act of foreign 
 
 241. Interpretation of this statute has been addressed by no less than three federal district 
courts (W.D. Okla., M.D. Pa., and D. Ariz) and one federal appellate court (Ninth Circuit), while 
two additional federal appellate courts (Tenth Circuit and Third Circuit) currently have the issue 
under submission.  See supra note 119. 
 242. See Nobel Peace Prize 2009 http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/ 
press.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
 243. See, e.g., Sam Stein, Obama’s Nobel Prize Inspires Conservative Outrage and 
Confusion, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 9, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/10/09/obamas 
-nobel-prize-inspir_n_315167.html (discussing sentiment that President Obama has not yet 
accomplished anything in his short presidency that would merit the award of the Nobel Peace 
Prize at this time) (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
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sovereignty,244 increasing globalization has made it more and more difficult for 
United States immigration policy to refrain from incorporating at least some 
norms of international law into our domestic immigration laws.245  As a result, 
immigrants’ rights advocates have for some time been calling for the United 
States to draw more liberally from an international human rights perspective in 
immigration law and policy, particularly as it pertains to the admission and 
removal of immigrants.246  Unfortunately, fearing that such an expansion of 
American immigration laws into the international realm might somehow 
negatively impact our sovereignty either implicitly or explicitly,247 Congress 
has thus far not chosen to amend the INA in a way that reflects many of the 
precepts of international human rights law.248 
In my opinion, however, a radical interpretation of the call to incorporate 
international human rights into American immigration law and policy can be 
reconciled with both the United States’ desire to control our sovereignty and 
our need for comprehensive immigration reform.  In fact, I believe that if there 
is to be meaningful immigration reform at the federal level, the political 
branches must do more than simply amend the INA—they must rewrite it to 
reflect what is rapidly becoming the internationalization of immigration law 
and policy within our borders.  Thus, I propose that—borrowing from the 
European Court of Justice’s doctrine of “freedom of movement”249—Congress 
and the Executive use their plenary power to regulate immigration to 
reconstruct our immigration laws and policies in a way that recognizes the 
inherent human right of migration, puts a definitive end to the devolution of 
 
 244. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (holding that the 
federal government has the authority as a sovereign nation to regulate its borders and the 
admission of persons into the interior). 
 245. For example, U.S. refugee and asylum law explicitly incorporates international treaties 
and pronouncements into the Immigration and Nationality Act.  See Immigration and Nationality 
Act § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2008) (codifying asylum and refugee protections under U.S. law). 
 246. See Saby Ghoshray, Is There a Human-Rights Dimension to Immigration? Seeking 
Clarity Through the Prism of Morality and Human Survival, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 1151, 1153 
(2007). 
 247. There has been a great deal of paranoia that internationalization of our immigration laws 
will cause the United States to follow the example of the European countries and unite with 
Mexico and Canada to form a “North American Union.”  See, e.g., Phillip Dine, Where Are They 
Going with This?, SEATTLE TIMES, May 19, 2007, at A3, available at http://seattletimes.nw 
source.com/html/nationworld/2003713518_rumor19.html. 
 248. In fact, Congress’s most recent comprehensive amendments to the INA in 1996 resulted 
in the criminalization of more categories of immigrants, with harsher penalties for immigrations 
convicted of relatively minor crimes, including deportation and mandatory detention pending 
removal proceedings.  See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2008). 
 249. Europa.eu, Free Movement of Persons, Asylum, and Immigration, http://europa.eu/ 
legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigra 
tion/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
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immigration federalism, and moves the United States forward into the global 
society we inhabit in the twenty-first century. 
B. Freedom of Movement and Common Immigration Policy in the European 
Union and Meaningful Comprehensive Immigration Reform in the United 
States 
One of the central principles of the European Union is the directive 
concerning the free movement of persons within the EU Member States.250  
The European Union’s concept of “freedom of movement” began with an idea 
that, upon reflection, seems rather modest—a commitment to the “freedom of 
workers” in Europe to migrate in order to make a living and support their 
families.251  However, it gradually expanded to cover the freedom of 
movement of all persons within the EU in order to, among other things, 
“provide a better definition of the status of family members and to limit the 
scope for refusing entry or terminating the right of residence.”252 
Out of this commitment to the freedom of movement for EU citizens has 
grown a comprehensive plan for a common immigration policy for Europe for 
members of non-EU Member Countries.253  While recognizing the differing 
needs of the various member countries, the EU policy on immigration for its 
member states strives toward a uniform system of immigration for its member 
states and strives “to work towards making EU and national immigration 
policies coherent and complementary,”254 and includes plans for addressing 
entry and residence,255 illegal immigration,256 and return and expulsion.257 
I propose that, for the Obama Administration to achieve meaningful 
comprehensive immigration reform in the United States, our national 
 
 250. See Europa.eu, Right of Union Citizens and their Family Members to Move and Reside 
Freely Within the Territory of the Member States, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_ 
freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigration/l33152_en.htm# (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2010). 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. See Europa.eu, A Common Immigration Policy for Europe, http://europa.eu/legislation_ 
summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigration/jl0001_ 
en.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
 254. Id. 
 255. See Europa.eu, Uniform Format for Residence Permits, http://europa.eu/legislation_ 
summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigration/l33043_ 
en.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
 256. See Europa.eu, Policy Priorities in the Fight Against Immigration, http://europa.eu/ 
legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigra 
tion/l14525_en.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
 257. See Europa.eu, Common Standards and Procedures for Returning Illegal Immigrants, 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_ 
asylum_immigration/jl0014_en.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
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immigration policy must reflect the spirit embodied in both the EU principle of 
freedom of movement for EU members countries and the common 
immigration policy toward non-EU member states. Invoking the plenary power 
doctrine to cause the States to recognize and respect the freedom of movement 
of residents of other states—that is, to not allow the several States to create 
their own barriers to movement of individuals by enacting independent 
immigration laws—will put a halt to the state balkanization of immigration 
regulations we have seen in the past decade.  Additionally, adopting the EU 
model of having the federal government create a comprehensive statement on 
common immigration policies for the States will not only once again 
reestablish Congress’s plenary power to regulate immigration, it will clearly 
signal to the States that they are not permitted to adopt regulations of 
immigration that conflict with the common immigration policies of the nation, 
lest they be preempted by federal law. 
While not a perfect solution to solving the immigration issue in the United 
States, I believe that adopting the views of the European Union regarding the 
inherent right of persons to move freely, and the importance of establishing a 
common immigration policy among jurisdictions whose interests are 
intertwined, can go a long way toward stopping the devolution of immigration 
law and policy.  I also think that clearly articulating a common immigration 
policy at the federal level—which clearly sets the boundaries of the ability of 
States to regulate in immigration matters—will mitigate much of ambiguity we 
have seen through repeated and confusing amendments of the INA over the 
years.  Such a national statement on immigration policy can not only serve to 
clarify our existing federal immigration law, but can also set aspirations for our 
immigration law and policy as we move into the twenty-first century. 
CONCLUSION 
As President Obama told the nation when he was still Candidate Obama, 
“Now is the time.”258  Now is the time not just for comprehensive immigration 
reform at the federal level, but for humane, meaningful immigration reform 
that respects the dignity of all persons and reflects both a knowledge and 
embrace of international human rights law.  The Obama Administration must 
work with Congress now to craft a national immigration policy that embodies 
not just the hope and promise of President Obama’s election, but the hope and 
promise of our nation as a country of immigrants.  Now is the time, for 
immigrants and citizens alike, to go forward together into the 21st century to 
 
 258. Then-Senator Obama delivered a powerful speech during his run for President of the 
United States at the Democratic National Convention in 2008 that subsequently come to be 
known as the “Now Is the Time” speech.  Barack Obama, Now Is the Time (Aug. 28, 2008), 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7587321.stm (full text of Obama’s speech accepting his 
nomination as the Democratic Party candidate for President in the 2008 election). 
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create a global immigration law and policy in the United States that reflects an 
evolution—not a devolution—of the federal government’s power to establish 
and enforce “a[] Uniform system of Naturalization”259 that fulfills the promise 
of our great nation as a haven for persons the world over regardless of race, 
color, ethnicity, or national origin.  Putting an end to the patchwork of local 
immigration laws that have sprung up in the last several years—while not the 
solution to our myriad national immigration issues—is an important first step 
toward rerouting United States immigration policy in the direction of 
meaningful comprehensive immigration reform, which must occur at the 
federal level. 
 
 
 259. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
